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 INFORMATIONAL BLACKMAIL: 
SURVIVED BY TECHNICALITY? 
CHEN YEHUDAI

 
Blackmail constitutes one of the most intriguing puzzles in criminal law: How can two legal 
rights—i.e., a threat to disclose true but reputation-damaging information and, independently, a 
simple demand for money—make a legal wrong?  The puzzle gets even more complicated when we 
take into account that it is not unlawful for one who holds embarrassing information to accept an 
offer of payment made by an unthreatened recipient in return for a promise not to disclose the 
information.  In order to answer this question, this Article surveys and analyzes the development of 
the law of informational blackmail and criminal libel in English and American law and argues that 
the modern crime of blackmail is the result of an “historical accident” stemming from the historical 
classification of blackmail as a property offense instead of a reputation-protecting offense.  The 
Article argues that when enacted, the prohibition on informational blackmail was meant to protect 
the interest of reputation as a supplement to the law of criminal libel.  As the concept of reputation 
shifted dramatically over time—from an honor-protecting concept to a dignity- and property-
protecting concept—most reputation-protecting offenses were decriminalized in the second half of 
the twentieth century.  The crime of blackmail, however, remained unjustifiably intact due to its 
misclassification as a property offense.  This Article, therefore, calls for the decriminalization of 
informational blackmail. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Blackmail is an intriguing crime in the sense that it appears in every well-
developed criminal code and strikes most people as wrongful, yet although 
many distinguished scholars have studied this crime, the rationale for it 
remains a puzzle. 
To understand the puzzle we first have to define the problem: How can the 
combination of two legal rights make a legal wrong?  Unlike extortion, which 
involves obtaining something with the threat of inflicting unlawful harm, 
blackmail involves a threat to do something that one has a legal right to do.
1
  
When B threatens to expose A‘s embarrassing information unless he is paid, 
B is guilty of blackmail, although it is legal (and in some cases even 
 
 J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University School of Law; LL.M., Columbia University School 
of Law, 2002; LL.B., The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, 1999.  The author would like to thank 
Professor George P. Fletcher, Professor Harold S.H. Edgar, Professor Daniel C. Richman, and Guy 
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1. See Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmailers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1663, 1663 (1993). 
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desirable) for him to expose or to threaten to expose the information and to 
demand compensation, if done separately. Combining these two rights, 
however, results in a criminal wrong. 
The puzzle gets even more complicated when we take into account the 
existence of a second paradox of blackmail: Any argument for the 
criminalization of blackmail must also explain the legality of the mirror image 
of blackmail, i.e., the fact that it is not unlawful for one who holds 
embarrassing information to accept an offer of payment made by an 
unthreatened recipient in return for a potential blackmailer‘s promise not to 
disclose the secret.
2
 
The current literature that supports the criminalization of blackmail can be 
divided into two competing views: that which focuses on the social 
consequences of blackmail, and that which focuses on blackmail as a wrong 
in itself.  As will be illustrated in this Article, both views are unsuccessful in 
fully explaining the rationale behind the blackmail prohibition. 
This Article contends that the criminalization of informational blackmail 
today is the result of an historical accident caused by the classification of 
blackmail as a property offense instead of a reputation-protecting offense.  
Though reputation offenses were reexamined and decriminalized in the 
second half of the twentieth century, blackmail remained unjustifiably intact 
due to its historical misclassification.  The traceable history and development 
of blackmail in England and the United States illustrates how that 
misclassification came to pass. 
Part II of this Article will introduce the various attempts to solve the 
blackmail paradox and their critiques.  Part III will proceed to analyze the 
history of the offense, beginning with the development of blackmail in 
nineteenth century England, a task which will require analyzing the law of 
criminal libel as well.  This part will then examine the development of laws 
governing blackmail and criminal libel in the United States.  Part IV will 
discuss perspective shifts regarding the essence of reputation and their effects 
on blackmail law.  This Article will demonstrate that the core of the 
incoherency surrounding blackmail lies in the lack of distinction between the 
different types of threats embodied in the extortion offense and their 
underlying rationales.  Uncovering such rationales will lead to the conclusion 
that informational blackmail should be decriminalized, as it seeks to protect a 
notion of reputation that no longer exists. 
 
2. See id. 
2009] INFORMATIONAL BLACKMAIL 781 
II. THEORIES OF BLACKMAIL 
The current theories on blackmail can be roughly divided into two 
prevalent approaches, each containing a variety of theories.  The first 
approach explains blackmail‘s criminalization by focusing on the harmful 
consequences that would follow blackmail‘s legalization.  The second 
approach explains the criminalization of blackmail by focusing on the 
immorality of one or more of the elements of the blackmail transaction itself, 
regardless of its consequences. 
A. The Consequentialist View 
1. Blackmail as Waste of Resources 
Douglas H. Ginsburg and Paul Shechtman view blackmail as a 
deadweight loss.
3
  They argue that blackmail is unlawful because there is 
social waste in employing resources to dig up information for the purpose of 
reburying it.
4
  According to the authors, the blackmail transaction does 
nothing but redistribute wealth.
5
  The victim‘s payment to the blackmailer 
benefits the blackmailer in the same amount that it harms the victim.
6
  
However, because the blackmailer incurs costs in digging up the information, 
his net gain is less than the victim‘s loss. 
In order to distinguish between legal transactions and blackmail, the 
authors focus their attention on the question of whether the realization of the 
threat would result in ―material benefit to the party making the threat.‖7  The 
authors argue that a legal system that is designed to maximize allocative 
efficiency would penalize, inter alia, threats to do something that the threat 
maker ―does have a right to do but that would (a) consume real resources, and 
(b) yield no product other than the enjoyment of spite or of an enhanced 
reputation as a credible issuer of threats.‖8  Because in most instances of 
blackmail, except for cases of market-price blackmail,
9
 threats of disclosure 
 
3. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law, 141 
U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1865 (1993). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id.  For a game theory analysis on the efficiency of criminalizing blackmail, see Fernando 
Gomez & Juan-Jose Ganuza, Civil and Criminal Sanction Against Blackmail: An Economic Analysis, 
21 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 475 (2002). 
9. I.e., instances where the information has market value and therefore the blackmailer can sell 
it. 
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would not confer material benefit on the threat maker, Ginsburg and 
Shechtman argue that these transactions should be illegal.
10
 
Ronald Coase makes a similar argument about deadweight loss.
11
  In The 
Problem of Social Cost, Coase argues that the value of production would be 
maximized if rights were deemed to be possessed by those who value them 
the most, thus eliminating the need for any transactions.
12
  Applying this 
argument in the context of blackmail, Coase concludes that ―the person who 
will pay the most for the right‖ to prevent the realization of the threat ―is 
normally the person being blackmailed.‖13  Therefore, ―[i]f the right to stop 
this action is denied to others, that is, blackmail is made illegal, transaction 
costs are reduced, factors of production are released for other purposes and 
the value of production is increased.‖14 
The deadweight loss argument encounters objections of being overly 
inclusive or not inclusive enough.  Professor Joseph Isenbergh challenges the 
premise that blackmail transactions are mere redistributive activities and have 
no allocative effect, pointing out that in the blackmail transaction, as in any 
other voluntary exchange, the blackmailer transfers something of value to the 
victim: his right to perform the act threatened.
15
  In order to outweigh this 
critique, one must assume that but for the sake of blackmail opportunity, the 
blackmailer would have no incentive to disclose the information.  However, 
this assumption does not account for the social value of information released 
through gossip channels.  Furthermore, these waste theories are unable to 
explain blackmail based on information acquired independent of incentives, 
i.e., opportunistic and participant blackmail (hereinafter, adventitious 
blackmail).
16
 
Although authors who espouse the deadweight loss theory address this 
critique, their answers are not satisfying.  Coase deals with this critique by 
arguing that while it is true that in the case of adventitious blackmail no 
resources are used to collect the information, resources would certainly be 
employed in the blackmailing transaction.
17
  Ginsburg and Shechtman deal 
with this critique by arguing that even if the first blackmail opportunity is 
 
10. See id. at 1874. 
11. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
12. Id. at 15–16. 
13. Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV. 655, 673 (1988). 
14. Id. 
15. Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1905, 1920 (1993). 
16. See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 689–
90 (1984).  Participant blackmail is a threat that is based on information arising from a prior 
relationship with the victim.  Id.  Opportunistic blackmail is a threat that is based on unexpectedly 
acquired information.  Id. at 690. 
17. See Coase, supra note 13, at 674. 
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accidental, once the blackmailer asks for payment in order to remain silent, he 
has become an entrepreneur of blackmail; therefore, the decision of whether 
to realize the ―threat to reveal the information is an investment decision, not a 
part of the earlier accident‖ of discovery.18  Ginsburg and Shechtman‘s 
answers underestimate once again the role of gossip in society and the fact 
that people tend to release information even if they do not expect material 
benefit from such revelation.
19
  Furthermore, this approach disregards motives 
such as spite, instead assuming that people are rational and therefore not 
psychologically benefitted by revealing said information. 
A third problem with the deadweight loss theory is its failure to explain 
the legality of non-criminal bribery, i.e., the case where the ―victim‖ 
approaches the ―blackmailer‖ with an offer to buy his silence.  As in 
blackmail, non-criminal bribery simply transfers wealth from the ―victim‖ to 
the information holder, while incurring some transaction cost.
20
  No 
economically relevant distinction exists between blackmail and non-criminal 
bribery.
21
 
Similarly, Steven Shavell also advocates for the criminalization of 
blackmail because of waste consideration.
22
  However, he focuses on the 
waste from a different angle: the victim‘s angle.23  According to Shavell, if 
blackmail were legal, resources would be wasted by individuals seeking to 
protect their privacy and innocent behavior from adventitious blackmail and 
subsequent blackmail.
24
 
By focusing on the victim‘s behavior, Shavell seeks to avoid the inability 
of the previous waste theories to account for the criminalization of 
adventitious blackmail.
25
  His attempt is unsuccessful, however, because his 
theory can explain the criminalization of adventitious blackmail that trades on 
socially harmless activities by the victim, but it cannot explain why we 
criminalize adventitious blackmail trading on socially undesirable activities. 
Isenbergh also tries to account for the criminalization of blackmail rooted 
in the issue of transaction costs.
26
  Isenbergh starts with a Coaseian analysis, 
arguing that criminal law shapes property rights by assigning these rights to 
 
18. Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 3, at 1875–76. 
19. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2237 (1996) (analyzing the role and value of gossip). 
20. See DeLong, supra note 1, at 1673–74. 
21. See id.  
22. Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail, 
Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1877, 1902 (1993). 
23. See id. 
24. Id. 
25. See id. 
26. Isenbergh, supra note 15, at 1925–26. 
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those who value them most.
27
  Isenbergh focuses on the nature of information 
as the commodity involved in the blackmail transaction.
28
  In a frictionless 
world, efficiency considerations would usually lead to a result where the 
subject of the transaction would be transferred to A (one bargaining party) if 
he values it more than B (the other bargaining party) and more than a third 
party.
29
  In the case where third parties value the subject of the transaction 
more than A, the transaction between A and B will not take place.  What 
makes the blackmail transaction unique is that the subject of the transaction is 
information, and consequently, the above outcome is not necessarily 
achieved.
30
  Often B, the information holder, cannot get from third parties an 
amount close to the full value of the information, because it is difficult to 
communicate to those parties the value of the information without 
communicating the information itself.  And once the information is shared, B 
has nothing left to sell.  Moreover, the value of the information is often 
diffused over a number of third parties.  These complications make it more 
likely that the blackmailer would sell the information to the victim, even if 
third parties value it more.  Subsequently, it is the bargaining over the 
disclosure of information that we seek to prevent, not the bare result of giving 
compensation for silence.
31
 
However, Isenbergh recognizes that totally banning blackmail would not 
produce an optimal result.
32
  As he points out, a ban on blackmail might even 
increase the incidence of blackmail because it produces a mechanism—the 
threat of criminal charges—that gives incentive to the blackmailer to honor 
the transaction and remain silent, thus eliminating the uncertainty that was 
inherent to the blackmail agreement.
33
  Therefore, Isenbergh concludes that 
we should use contract law, and not criminal law, to deal with the 
inefficiencies of blackmail.
34
  He proposes a regime where contracts of 
silence, except for contracts where the parties knew each other before the 
blackmail transaction, are void and unenforceable.
35
 
 
27. Id. at 1910–11. 
28. Id. 
29. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. Id. at 1925–26. 
32. See id. at 1927–28. 
33. Id. at 1928. 
34. Id. at 1930. 
35. See id. at 1928–30.  Contract law might be a better solution to reduce the amount of 
blackmail transactions because of the uncertain conditions that contract law preserves:  If the contract 
is unenforceable, the blackmailee gains no real control over disclosure.  Id.  If the blackmailer cannot 
assure the blackmailee of any increased control over disclosure, the blackmailer cannot extract much 
from the blackmailee and therefore has little reason to invest much effort in bargaining.  Id. 
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Robert Nozick introduces an explanation of blackmail on the grounds of 
coercion as unproductive exchange.
36
  According to Nozick, an exchange is 
unproductive if prohibiting it would not make one of the parties to the 
potential exchange worse off.
37
  Because in the blackmail transaction the 
victim would be better off if the blackmailer did not exist at all (and hence 
was not threatening him) and no worse off if the exchange was prohibited, 
blackmail should be made illegal.
38
 
The foremost problem with the theory of unproductive exchange is that it 
does not explain why the criminal law should have an interest in punishing 
unproductive exchange.  Even assuming that the criminal law has an interest 
in prohibiting such an exchange, it cannot distinguish legitimate behavior 
from illegitimate behavior.  Nozick limits the test of unproductive exchange to 
cases where the person being threatened does not deserve the threatened 
punishment.
39
  He does so to justify, for example, instances where a tort 
victim threatens to sue the tortfeasor.  In doing so, Nozick ignores the fact that 
there are types of blackmail where the threat is to inflict a deserved harm, for 
example, the threat to turn in a criminal to the police.  Furthermore, this 
account does not explain why market-price blackmail is illegal.  In the case of 
market-price blackmail the victim will want the opportunity to pay for the 
information in order to prevent it from being published. 
2. Blackmail Ban Protects Privacy 
Jeffrie Murphy argues that blackmail gives incentive to invasions of 
privacy.
40
  Murphy begins his analysis with several propositions.  First, he 
proposes that immorality is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
criminalizing an act.
41
  Second, he asserts that the criteria to distinguish 
between immoral acts that should be criminalized and immoral acts that 
should be legal can be utilitarian.
42
  Murphy argues that both blackmail and 
hard bargaining transactions involve taking an unfair advantage of the 
victim‘s vulnerability, and are therefore immoral.43  Murphy distinguishes 
between private persons, public figures, and public officials as victims.
44
  
 
36. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 84–87 (1974); see also Robert 
Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 
440, 447 (S. Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969). 
37. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 36, at 84–85. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. at 84–87. 
40. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminary Inquiry, 63 MONIST 156, 159 (1980). 
41. Id. at 163. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 163–66. 
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What distinguishes private from public persons is the lack of a market for 
information about the former.  Without blackmail, there is no economic 
interest in invading a private person‘s privacy in an attempt to find out secret 
details of his life.  Decriminalizing blackmail would create a potential market 
for secret information about private persons as well and would provide an 
incentive to invade their privacy.  Therefore, after finding that the blackmail 
transaction is exploitive and hence immoral, utilitarian considerations justify 
the criminalization of blackmail in order to protect the privacy of nonpublic 
figures. 
The main problem with Murphy‘s theory is similar to the problem that the 
waste-based theories face: adventitious blackmail, i.e., instances of blackmail 
where the information is not acquired because of any incentive for invasions 
of privacy.
45
  Moreover, Murphy‘s distinction between private persons and 
public figures on the ground of market existence is not accurate.  As Lindgren 
points out, ―[t]here is a limited but significant market for information about 
private individuals.‖46  The existence of such a market invalidates Murphy‘s 
grounds of justification for treating the blackmail of private persons and the 
blackmail of public figures differently. 
3. Blackmail Ban Prevents Resort to Self-Help 
Henry Smith offers a solution to the blackmail paradox based on society‘s 
concern for the victim.
47
  According to Smith, we can distinguish blackmail 
from related legal behavior by focusing on the victim‘s temptation to engage 
in harmful self-help.
48
 
Smith maintains that we have reason to distrust the decision-making of 
both the blackmailer and the victim in a blackmail negotiation.
49
  On the one 
hand, the victim‘s cost-benefit analysis, which is based on his high valuation 
of secrecy, will be radically different from that of the ordinary person because 
the victim would be more tempted to commit a range of harms in order to 
preserve his secret.
50
  On the other hand, the blackmailer does not weigh the 
 
45. Lindgren was the first commentator to raise this objection.  Lindgren, supra note 16, at 691.  
He claims that even if we see the significant invasion of privacy not in the acquisition of the 
information, but in its sale to the blackmail victim, we could not avoid the criticism.  Id.  The 
blackmail victim is trying to suppress the information precisely because its release would invade his 
privacy.  Id.  Bargaining by itself would tend to increase, not decrease, the victim‘s ability to 
preserve his privacy.  Id. 
46. Id. at 692. 
47. Henry E. Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 861, 862 (1998). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 867. 
50. See id. 
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victim‘s behavior costs into his cost analysis.51  Smith then concludes, ―[i]f 
we do not trust the participants‘ decision-making and the activity is, on 
balance, generally not worth the cost, specific deterrence—including criminal 
prohibition—is in order.‖52 
Smith presents a cost-benefit model to show why criminalization is the 
most efficient way to prevent the harms of blackmail.
53
  Through his model, 
Smith shows how the use of criminal sanctions would reduce the payoff from 
the initial choice to make a threat in comparison to the payoff from the choice 
to not make a threat.
54
  It seems that in this very goal, Smith‘s theory is 
inconsistent.  If the rationale that underlies the criminalization of blackmail is 
fear of the victim‘s actions, we have no moral basis to prefer the victim over 
the blackmailer, except for the fact that the victim is the cheapest cost avoider.  
If this is so, the model fails to explain why the mirror image of blackmail is 
legal.
55
  If we assume, as Smith assumes, that the blackmailer will resort to 
self-help because he highly values secrecy, the victim‘s mere knowledge that 
someone holds his secret is the coercive trigger that makes him more willing 
to resort to unlawful means.  If we assume that the threat of blackmail is what 
makes the victim resort to means of self-help, it is not clear why the threat is 
not feared in cases of hard bargaining, where the victim highly values the 
commodity subject to the bargaining.
56
  If we assume that what makes the 
victim resort to self-help is the uncertainty that the blackmailer would not 
repeat his demand, and if we assume that we have no moral grounds to favor 
the victim, contract and tort law can create a disincentive for the blackmailer 
to achieve the same goal. 
4. Blackmail Breeds Fraud and Deceit 
Richard Epstein argues that blackmail breeds fraud and deceit in two 
ways: it induces incidences of theft and fraud by victims seeking to obtain the 
 
51. See id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 895–96. 
54. Id. 
55. Smith accounts for the legality of the mirror image transaction by asserting: ―On the present 
view, by contrast, the legality of the mirror image of the blackmail transaction makes sense.  If the 
potential victim feels secure enough to initiate the transaction, there is more reason to think the 
victim is not the type to undertake violent self-help.‖  Id. at 908.  It is not clear why Smith presumes 
that the victim would initiate such a transaction only if he feels secure enough. 
56. Smith assumes that in these cases the victims‘ actions of self-help would be stealing the 
commodity from the one who holds it.  See id. at 912.  But this is not necessarily so because the 
victim may prefer to use third party resources.  Moreover, it seems that under this explanation the 
only thing that distinguishes hard bargaining from blackmail is that in blackmail the subject of the 
transaction is information, and it is not stealable.  Shouldn‘t this analysis prohibit any transaction 
where its subject is information? 
788 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:779 
amount required by the blackmailer, and it incentivizes the blackmailer to take 
an active role in defrauding third parties.
57
 
Epstein argues that the legalization of blackmail would result in a 
formation of businesses—he calls these hypothetical business ventures 
Blackmail, Inc.—that would seek to exploit the gains from this new form of 
legal activity: 
 
Blackmail, Inc. could with impunity place advertisements in 
the newspaper offering to acquire for top dollar any 
information with the capacity to degrade or humiliate persons 
in the eyes of their families or business associates.  
Thereafter, Blackmail, Inc., as a commercial organization, 
could negotiate contracts with its sources to suppress the 
information acquired.
58
 
 
In a world where Blackmail, Inc. exists, the very existence of this 
corporation affects the relationship between the victim and third parties in 
several ways.  First, by being a ―full-service firm‖ the corporation might do 
more than collect money from the victim; it might actively help him conceal 
the information from third parties that have a legitimate interest in that 
information.
59
  Second, Blackmail, Inc. may incur some externalities.
60
  For 
example, in a case where the victim does not have the money to satisfy the 
demand, he might resort to fraud or theft because he cannot resort to his usual 
―financial sources, such as banks or friends, who would want to know the 
purpose of the loan.‖61 
Epstein‘s analysis has serious problems.  For one, if his analysis is correct, 
and one of the reasons to ban blackmail is to stop the blackmailer from being 
an accomplice to the victim‘s scheme of fraud and deception, why shouldn‘t 
we find the victim criminally responsible for this conduct as well?  Epstein, 
aware of this issue, tries to resolve it by suggesting that ―[t]he puzzle, 
accordingly, is somewhat transformed, as the question might be better asked, 
why is it that [the victim] escapes criminal punishment for deception, not why 
is [the blackmailer] punished for blackmail.‖62  Moreover, the mere 
assumption that the victim tries to hide embarrassing information does not 
necessarily amount to a form of fraud and deceit. 
 
57. Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail, Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 553, 565 (1983). 
58. Id. at 562–63. 
59. Id. at 564. 
60. See id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 565. 
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A third problem is Epstein‘s premise in his analysis that force and fraud 
underlie the criminal law‘s proper reach.63  This conclusion is potentially 
faulty considering the variety of victimless crimes such as gambling, 
prostitution, and drug use, as well as crimes that do not involve force or 
fraud.
64
 
It seems that all of the theories described above fail to provide adequate 
explanation for blackmail‘s criminalization due to (1) their inability to explain 
why we criminalize blackmail in the first place; (2) their inability to explain 
why certain types of blackmail are criminalized when the consequences that 
they seek to prevent do not exist (the common problem of most of these 
theories is accounting for adventitious blackmail); and (3) their inability to 
explain why we do not prohibit other conduct that produces similar harm. 
B. The Deontological Approach 
1. Using a Third Party‘s Leverage 
The approach introduced by James Lindgren focuses on the triangular 
nature of the blackmail transaction.
65
  According to Lindgren, the blackmail 
transaction implicitly involves not only the blackmailer and his victim, but 
also always a third party.
66
  Unlike the case of a legitimate threat, in the 
blackmail transaction the blackmailer interposes himself in a dispute where he 
lacks a sufficiently direct interest.
67
  When making the blackmail demand, the 
blackmailer tries to gain personal benefit by using a third party‘s leverage and 
suppressing this party‘s actual or potential interest.68  In Lindgren‘s view, 
―blackmail law is a manifestation of a core principle of our legal system, the 
assignment of enforcement rights to the victim.‖69 
Lindgren acknowledges that the mere use of the third party chip is not 
enough to distinguish blackmail from other legal bargaining.
70
  To complete 
his theory, Lindgren proposes a two-tier test.
71
  The first tier is the existence 
of a threat (although he gives no account for what constitutes a threat).
72
  Only 
 
63. See id. 
64. See Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives Seriously, 
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 816 (1998). 
65. Lindgren, supra note 16, at 702. 
66. Id. at 672. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 702. 
69. Id. at 704. 
70. See id. at 716. 
71. See id. at 716–17. 
72. Id. 
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if this tier is satisfied can we move to the second tier and examine whether the 
threatening party used a third party‘s chip to achieve personal gains.73 
The main criticism of Lindgren‘s theory is that while it is successful 
descriptively, it lacks a normative account that explains why using someone 
else‘s leverage for individual gain should be unlawful when the law does not 
otherwise recognize their interest in the blackmail transaction (the law gives 
that person no claim for compensation against either the blackmailer or the 
victim).  Moreover, it is not always simple to identify the specific third person 
whose leverage has been used.
74
 
Another objection was raised by DeLong.
75
  As DeLong indicates, if the 
use of a third party‘s leverage or chips is wrongful, why is it legal to use these 
parties‘ chips when there is no threat?76  Lindgren tries to respond to this 
critique by maintaining that the combination of threat or coercion with the use 
of third party leverage is what makes blackmail wrongful, yet he fails to 
define which conduct qualifies under the first requirement.
77
 
2. Dominance and Subordination 
George Fletcher argues that ―blackmail is not an anomalous crime but 
rather a paradigm for understanding both criminal wrongdoing and 
punishment.‖78  According to Fletcher, an examination of the criminal law 
reveals that its core is expressed in an act of achieving dominance over 
others.
79
  To know whether a negotiation constitutes blackmail, we should 
examine whether the transaction with the alleged blackmailer generates a 
relationship of dominance and subordination.
80
  ―Blackmail occurs when, by 
virtue of the demands and the action satisfying the demands, the blackmailer 
knows that she can repeat the demand in the future.  Living with that 
knowledge puts the victim of blackmail in a permanently subordinate 
position.‖81  Therefore, to frustrate the blackmailer‘s power over the victim, 
the state must intervene by employing the criminal law.
82
  Fletcher maintains 
 
73. Id. 
74. See Smith, supra note 47, at 885–86.  However, it seems that this criticism can be avoided 
if we modify the theory to require an intrusion and benefit from the blackmailer and victim‘s 
relationship. 
75. DeLong, supra note 1, at 1673–74. 
76. Id. 
77. Lindgren, supra note 16, at 710. 
78. George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1617, 1617 
(1993). 
79. Id. at 1626. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347, 354 (1996). 
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that in order to ensure that the blackmailer will not continue his domination 
over the victim, it is not enough to make the blackmailer pay damages; he 
must be deprived of liberty and be stigmatized.
83
 
Fletcher‘s theory raises some difficulties.  The main difficulty is the 
repetition element, which is crucial to the dominance-subordination 
relationship.  Fletcher argues that a one-time transaction with no possibility of 
recurring cannot establish a wrongful domination: 
 
When [the blackmailer‘s] demand is a one-shot affair, as 
when [the blackmailer] threatens to sue in tort if [the victim] 
does not agree to the payment demanded, there is no crime. 
There is no way to explain this or the other cases of 
nonpunishable threats except to note that [the victim‘s] 
payment effects a settlement and thus negates the possibility 
of repeated demands.  Conversely, all the cases of punishable 
blackmail generate a situation that invites repeated threats and 
exploitation.
84
 
 
Following this reasoning, why not define the crime as occurring when the 
second act of blackmail takes place?  Fletcher answers this question by 
arguing that dominance is not a state of affairs that crystallizes only as a result 
of repeated demands, but rather is a state of anticipation, and thus ―[w]hen 
both parties know that the victim has submitted once and has no defense 
against submitting again, he is at the mercy of the blackmailer.  His only hope 
lies in the intervention of the police or other agents of the criminal law.‖85 
This answer is not satisfactory.  There are mechanisms in private law to 
ensure that a blackmail transaction will be only a one-time transaction.  For 
example, by making blackmail legal, we can prevent repetitive demands 
because once there is a second demand, the victim can refuse to pay, holding a 
threat to sue for breach of contract as leverage against the blackmailer.  In this 
case, the blackmailer has two options: waive the repetition of his demand or 
reveal the victim‘s secret.  If he decides to disclose the secret, he will incur 
the victim‘s losses from the revelation.  Another option is to add a 
reimbursement clause to the initial contract, which would come into effect 
once the information is disclosed.  Employing these mechanisms, we do not 
have to resort to punishment to counteract the relationship of dominance 
because the problem is solved at an earlier stage, i.e., the stage of defining the 
wrongfulness of the action. 
 
83. Id. 
84. Fletcher, supra note 78, at 1637. 
85. Id. at 1638. 
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A second difficulty in Fletcher‘s theory lies in the fact that the legal 
system itself establishes relationships of dominance and subordination, such 
as the parent-child relationship.  Fletcher acknowledges this but adds that ―the 
blackmailer‘s actions are somehow intrinsically wrong and unjustified.‖86  As 
evidence, he provides several deontological accounts as a solution to the 
paradox of blackmail.
87
  However, as Fletcher himself asserts, these theories 
do not offer ―a convincing account of the difference between cases of 
punishable and non-punishable conduct.‖88 
3. Blackmail and the Demanded Advantage 
Leo Katz introduces a theory of blackmail as a type of robbery.
89
  Katz 
argues that coercion can exist even in cases where we increase the victim‘s 
options.
90
  Katz presents the ―punishment puzzle‖ to show that there are areas 
in the law where we punish someone for the underlying wrong even when he 
gives the victim an alternative option.
91
  According to Katz, the blackmail 
transaction is in fact a situation where the blackmailer forces the person he is 
blackmailing to choose between theft (or some other criminal violation) and 
another minor wrong.
92
  When the blackmailer makes the victim choose 
between the above alternatives, the severity of the blackmailer‘s wrongdoing 
should be judged by what he sought to achieve and not by what he threatened 
to do.
93
  That is the reason why taking money, which the victim prefers 
compared to the minor immorality of disclosing information, is more than the 
minor immorality itself. 
There are some problems with Katz‘s theory.  If the blackmailer‘s 
blameworthiness is determined by the demanded advantage, why then treat 
blackmail as a separate offense and not as an annex to each offense 
threatened?  For example, if the threat demanded silence for money, then the 
charge should be theft; if the threat was silence for sexual favors, then the 
charge should be rape. 
 
86. Id. at 1637. 
87. Id. at 1618–21. 
88. Id. at 1637. 
89. Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1595–96 
(1993). 
90. See id. at 1574. 
91. Id. at 1582–83. 
92. Katz notes that although the wrong need not be an immorality that comes anywhere close to 
being criminal, it must not be too minor.  Id. at 1597.  However, although the threat has to be of 
something more serious than garden-variety nastiness or unpleasantness, it does not have to be that 
much more serious.  Id. at 1606. 
93. Id. at 1598–99. 
2009] INFORMATIONAL BLACKMAIL 793 
When referring to the punishment puzzle, Katz gives examples to prove 
his point.
94
  However, in his examples, the victim has to choose between 
many things he is entitled to, things that are protected by law.
95
  Arguably, 
once society determines the value of a harm under the criminal law, that harm 
has objective value that prevails over the value the victim assigns to it.  Thus, 
Katz‘s leap to blackmail transactions is not trivial.  Moreover, as Lindgren 
points out, by assuming that what the blackmailer threatens to do is immoral, 
Katz merely ―assumes away the paradox.‖96  For example, often what the 
blackmailer threatens to do is a moral right or at least an action that is not 
clearly wrong—for example, exposing a criminal or telling a friend that her 
spouse is cheating on her.
97
  In theses instances, we return to the question of 
why it is immoral to reveal the information. 
4. Blackmail as Evidence of Wrongful Motives 
Mitchell Berman argues that the act of blackmail has evidentiary 
significance: It reveals the moral character of the actor‘s motivation that we 
would be less likely to suspect had he disclosed the information without first 
having made demands for payment (or other favors).
98
  Berman‘s analysis 
begins with the proposition that society may criminalize conduct that tends 
both to cause harm and to be undertaken with wrongful motives.
99
  Because 
the blackmailer knowingly threatens to inflict harm without good motives, the 
transaction satisfies the two above conditions of moral blameworthiness and 
harm causing, and thus it may be criminalized.
100
 
Berman maintains that the law recognizes injury to reputation as a legally 
cognizable harm.
101
  The reason we do not criminalize all disclosure of 
information that can injure one‘s reputation is that people reveal embarrassing 
information about others due to varying moral postures.
102
  These various 
motives provide a sufficient explanation for society‘s refusal to criminalize all 
such revelations.
103
  However, in blackmail, the disclosure of the information 
is the mere reaction to the victim‘s refusal to pay.104  Therefore, by using the 
 
94. Id. at 1582–83. 
95. See id. 
96. James Lindgren, Blackmail: An Afterword, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1975, 1977 (1993). 
97. Id. 
98. Berman, supra note 64, at 849. 
99. See id. at 810. 
100. Id. at 848. 
101. Id. at 854. 
102. Id. at 798. 
103. Id. 
104. See id. 
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blackmail demand as evidence, we can conclude that the disclosure was 
driven by a morally negative motivation.
105
 
Berman‘s theory is problematic for several reasons.  First, focusing on the 
bad intention of the perpetrator is not enough to establish a criminal offense.  
Although good will is essential to the claim that an act has moral value, it 
does not follow that bad will renders an action evil.
106
  Another problem in 
Berman‘s theory lies in the assumption that the law recognizes injury to 
reputation as a legally cognizable harm.  As will be discussed later in this 
Article, the law recognizes as a legally cognizable harm only injuries to 
reputation that are based on false statements.
107
  Therefore, if the blackmailer 
holds truthful information, there is no legally cognizable harm, and the first 
prong of Berman‘s third criterion is not fulfilled.  Furthermore, even if we 
assume that any injury to reputation is a legally cognizable harm, regardless 
of the truthfulness of the information, wouldn‘t we want to prevent this harm 
by giving the victim an option to avoid it? 
Most of the theories in the deontological section try to account for the 
criminalization of blackmail either by focusing on the immorality of the harm 
threatened or by focusing on the threat itself as a morally aggravating factor.  
However, it appears that most of these theories just assume away the paradox 
instead of solving it. 
 
105. Berman proposes a four-step test to assess whether any given proposition that meets 
blackmail formal requirements should be blackmail for purposes of the criminal law: 
 
First, assume the actor simply performed the act threatened (y) and ask 
whether that action is itself criminal.  If the answer is yes, then the proposition 
is just a threat to perform a criminal act and is not blackmail . . . . 
Second, if the act, y, is not itself criminal, ask whether it causes or 
threatens legally cognizable harm.  If it does not, then it cannot be made 
criminal . . . . 
If the act is not criminal yet causes harm that is cognizable for purposes of 
the criminal law, the next task is to explore whether the actor has morally bad 
motives. The third step, therefore, is to identify which particular reason(s) for 
action would have made the actor‘s harm-causing conduct morally justified.  
The fourth step is to ask whether the actor‘s offer not to perform y on condition 
x makes it materially less likely that he was actually motivated by any one of 
the morally justifying reasons identified in the third step. If so (and if that 
perceived likelihood is sufficiently low) the original proposition should be 
condemned as blackmail. 
Id. at 853–54 (footnotes omitted). 
106. George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687, 
695 (2000).  Fletcher points out that there is a ―philosophical misreading [of] Kant‘s theory of the 
goodwill in morality [that leads some people] to support a concentrated focus on criminal intention as 
the basis of criminal liability.‖  Id. 
107. See infra Part IV. 
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My thesis is that the criminalization of blackmail today is the result of an 
historical accident caused by the classification of blackmail as a property 
offense.  That is the reason why, as was illustrated in this section, no 
satisfactory explanation for the criminalization of blackmail exists in the 
academic community to date. 
When originally enacted, blackmail was part of a group of offenses 
seeking to protect reputation, a mere supplement to the law of criminal libel.  
However, the concept of reputation the offense sought to protect was not the 
same concept of reputation that prevails today.  When acts of blackmail were 
criminalized it was for the purpose of protecting one‘s honor and social role, a 
concept of reputation that ceased to exist as cultural understandings shifted. 
This Article will illustrate, through examination of the development of 
blackmail law, that the reason the offense survived is due to a pure 
technicality, i.e., the historic classification of the offense as a property offense 
and not as an offense threatening to injure a reputation.  Therefore, when 
―reputation offenses‖ were reexamined and decriminalized in the second half 
of the twentieth century, the offense of blackmail was simply forgotten and 
thus unjustifiably remained intact.  This Article asserts that if blackmail were 
reexamined with the rest of the ―reputation offenses,‖ it would have led to its 
decriminalization.  This is not to say that today the act of blackmail should be 
viewed as moral; it is to say only that it should not be dealt with in the 
criminal law. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACKMAIL 
To see how this accident came about, we first must examine the origins, 
history, and development of blackmail law in England and the United States.  
This Part will begin by looking into English law and then will proceed to 
review American law. 
A. Blackmail in English Law 
To best understand the source of the blackmail anomalies, our point of 
reference should be the year 1916, when the Larceny Act was enacted.
108
  The 
Act categorized three separate offenses into three provisions: Section 29, 
Section 30, and Section 31, all of which were later interpreted to penalize the 
behavior of informational blackmail.
109
  Examination of the origins and 
wordings of these provisions reveals that only Section 31 was intended to deal 
 
108. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, §§ 29–31 (Eng.). 
109. See, e.g., W.H.D. Winder, The Development of Blackmail, 5 MOD. L. REV. 21, 21 (1941). 
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with informational blackmail,
110
 whereas Sections 29 and 30 were intended to 
deal only with extortion (i.e., a threat to perform a criminal act). 
The following section will look at the history and the development of each 
provision of the Larceny Act, supporting the argument that only Section 31 
was intended to deal with informational blackmail.  This will bring us to the 
further conclusion that the law of informational blackmail was in fact an 
integral part of the law of criminal libel. 
Section 31 reads as follows: 
 
Every person who with intent— 
 
a)  to extort any valuable thing from any person, or 
 
b)  to induce any person to confer or procure for any 
person any appointment or office of profit or trust, 
 
1.  publishes or threatens to publish any libel upon any 
other person (whether living or dead); or 
 
2.  directly or indirectly threatens to print or publish, or 
directly or indirectly proposes to abstain from or offers 
to prevent the printing or publishing of any matter or 
things touching any other person (whether living or 
dead); 
 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and on conviction thereof 
liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for any 
term not exceeding two years.
111
 
 
The origin of this provision, in which informational blackmail was first 
penalized, is Section 3 of the Libel Act of 1843.
112
  Before 1843, the ordinary 
behavior of blackmail was legal.
113
 
 
110. Larceny Act §§ 29–31.  Informational blackmail can be defined as a threat to expose 
information coupled with a demand for money.  However, in this Article, informational blackmail 
will not include a threat to accuse a person of a crime because, as will be shown in this Article, the 
rationale for prohibiting such threats is not derived from the same rationale of informational 
blackmail: In a threat to accuse a person of a crime, if the allegations were true then the blackmailer 
had a duty to disclose the information under the rule of misprision of felony.  See JOEL FEINBERG,  
HARMLESS WRONGDOING 243 (1988).  Even in the absence of such a rule it can be argued that the 
integrity of the legal system requires that such a threat be made only within the system itself.  
111. Larceny Act § 31. 
112. Libel Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 96, §§ 3, 6 (Eng.). 
113. Peter Alldridge, „Attempted Murder of the Soul‟: Blackmail, Privacy and Secrets, 13 
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The Victorian era, during which the Libel Act was passed, was 
characterized as the ―heyday of blackmail.‖114  The prosperity of the 
blackmail ―industry‖ was attributed to the Victorian social structure, which 
attached an exceptionally high value to respectability and hence to a good 
reputation.
115
 
The importance of respectability in those times led to the creation of a 
special committee led by Lord Campbell to examine and recommend 
amendments to the law of libel.  The committee recommended the 
criminalization of informational blackmail, unprecedented at the time.  The 
decision to criminalize informational blackmail was consistent with the 
existing law of criminal libel and in fact supplemented it, as both offenses 
sought to protect the interest of reputation. 
The common law of criminal libel included four categories: private 
defamation, seditious libel, blasphemy, and obscenity.
116
  All four categories 
were designed to guarantee that speech did not violate established norms of 
respect and propriety.
117
  Under these rules, private defamation could be 
treated either as a crime or a tort at the option of the injured person, as long as 
the defamation consisted of the publication of writing that held him up to 
hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
118
  There were two major considerations, besides 
of course the remedy issue, that differentiated the crime of libel from the tort 
of libel.
119
  One consideration was that in order to initiate a civil action, the 
defamatory statement had to be made to a person other than the one 
defamed.
120
  This was not so in criminal libel.  Another difference was that 
truth was an absolute defense in civil defamation suits, whereas it was not a 
defense in criminal libel prosecutions.
121
  Thus, truth was no defense for an 
indictment for libel.  Not only was it immaterial whether the insult was true or 
false, but also a true utterance was regarded even more severely than a false 
one, and thus Lord Mansfield‘s famous maxim, ―the greater the truth the 
greater the libel.‖122 
 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 368, 372 (1993).  Blackmail was legal, except when a person threatened to 
accuse another of committing a crime.  See id. at 372–73. 
114. Id. at 374. 
115. Id. 
116. Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and 
Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 279 (2003).  In this Article the term 
―criminal libel‖ will refer to private defamation only. 
117. Id. at 278. 
118. Id. at 316–17. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 317. 
121. Id. at 316–17. 
122. See Roy Robert Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 43 n.1 (1931). 
798 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:779 
In the seventeenth century, the common view was that certain publications 
could provoke a breach of the peace.
123
  At that time, private libels would 
often result in a challenge and a duel, and therefore, the state had an interest in 
criminalizing such behavior.
124
  Identifying libel as an offense was intended to 
provide the victim with the means of securing his defamer‘s punishment via 
the peaceful process of the law as opposed to resorting to personal violence to 
obtain revenge.
125
 
This view of breach of the peace as the rationale for criminal libel may 
have been compelling in the seventeenth century; however, as far as the Libel 
Act of 1843 is concerned, that was not necessarily valid anymore.  As noted 
above, the Libel Act of 1843 was based on a report by Lord Campbell‘s 
special committee.  In its recommendation, the committee did not follow the 
breach of the peace rationale, but rather chose to see the Act as a means to 
protect one‘s reputation and nothing more.  In Lord Campbell‘s words: 
 
It seems to me that the Ground upon which it is said that 
private Defamation is criminal, is wholly fallacious.  The 
Ground generally alleged is that it leads to a Breach of the 
Peace.  I do not think that that is so either on Principle or in 
Practice.  On Principle, I think that Defamation is a Crime 
like Theft or Battery of the Person; it is doing an Injury to a 
Member of Society, who is entitled to the Protection of the 
Law, and the Person who perpetrates that Injury ought to be 
punished as an Example to others, to prevent a Repetition of 
the Offence.  In Practice Prosecutions for Libel are uniformly 
instituted and conducted by the Party injured, and merely 
with a View of vindicating the Character of the Party injured, 
or of having Revenge upon the Libeler, and not in the 
remotest Degree with any View to the Protection of the public 
Peace.
126
 
 
123. See Case de Libellis Famosis, (1605) 5 Co. Rep. 125a, 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250, 251 (Star 
Ch. Ca.). 
124. Id.  According to Sir Edward Coke, the principal points resolved in de Libellis Famosis, a 
case which is regarded as the beginning of the modern law of criminal libel, are: 
 
Every libel . . . is made either against a private man, or against a magistrate 
or public person.  If it be against a private man it deserves a severe punishment, 
for although the libel be made against one, yet it incites all those of the same 
family, kindred, or society to revenge, and so tends per consequens to quarrels 
and breach of the peace, and may be the cause of shedding of blood and of great 
inconvenience . . . . 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
125. Brenner, supra note 116, at 316. 
126. SELECT COMM. OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER THE LAW OF 
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The function of the references to tendency to disturb the peace was no more 
than to illustrate the various factors that either alone or in combination 
contributed to the gravity of the libel. 
One of the committee‘s recommendations was to change the law 
regarding truth as a defense in criminal libel cases.  The committee 
recommended allowing the truth to be introduced as a defense in criminal 
libel proceedings as well, though it recommended that it ought not to amount 
to an absolute defense; the committee believed the truth should be introduced 
only when the publication is justifiable. 
 
The recommendation of the committee, therefore, was that 
the proof of truth should in no case be excluded, but that it 
should not be an absolute bar in criminal, any more than in 
civil proceedings.  This would leave the jury, under the 
direction of the judge, the power of deciding (the plea of truth 
being proved) whether there was or was not proper occasion 
to publish it; and if the jury felt that the object of the party 
publishing was a malicious one—was that of raking up what 
ought to be forgotten, and of making notorious personal 
infirmities in which the public has no interest—of attacking 
the feelings of a family by publishing what may be true, but 
ought to be forgotten, concerning any member of it—if this 
were the opinion of the jury, they would find the defendant 
guilty, and he would be punished accordingly.
127
 
 
 
DEFAMATION AND LIBEL, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, 1843, at 177, in 5 REPORTS FROM COMMITTEES: 
SEVEN VOLUMES, ADMIRALTY COURTS, ALIENS, DEFAMATION AND LIBEL 443 (London, Her 
Majesty‘s Stationery Office 1843) [hereinafter SELECT COMM.] (statement of Lord Campbell).  The 
modern English definition of criminal libel seems to follow this line.  In Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd., 
(1977) 1 W.L.R. 478, 485 (A.C.) (Eng.), Lord Denning defined criminal libel as a case where the 
 
libel is so serious that the offender should be punished for it by the state itself.  
He should either be sent to prison or made to pay a fine to the state itself.  
Whereas a civil libel does not come up to that degree of enormity.  The 
wrongdoer has to pay full compensation in money to the person who is libelled 
and pay his costs: and he can be ordered not to do it again.  But he is not to be 
sent to prison for it or pay a fine to the state.  When a man is charged with 
criminal libel, it is for the jury to say on which side of the line it falls.  That is to 
say, whether or not it is so serious as to be a crime. 
Id. at 485. 
127. 69 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3rd ser.) (1843) 1231–32 (emphasis added) (statement of Lord 
Campbell).  Note: The legislature accepted the committee recommendations regarding truth as a 
defense to only criminal libel.  70 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3rd ser.) (1843) 1252–53.  The role of truth in 
civil libel was unchanged.  Id. 
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In the committee‘s eyes, the publication of true facts should not be 
justifiable if an ―attempt was made to extort money by the threat of libelling 
an individual or a member of his family, and the [information] was published 
because the money was not paid.‖128  This view caused blackmail to be 
considered the most serious form of libel.
129
 
In the Libel Act of 1843, the legislature adopted, with slight 
modifications, Lord Campbell‘s recommendations regarding truth as a 
defense in criminal libel.
130
  The Act enabled such defense to be introduced if 
the publication was made with good motives and justifiable ends.
131
  Thus, 
publishing truthful information due only to a refusal to pay money, the typical 
response of a blackmailer whose demands are not met, could not satisfy the 
requirements of good motives in the defense of truth and therefore amounted 
to libel.  The requirement of good motives prevented blackmailers from 
realizing their threats.  Section 3 of the Libel Act of 1843, which prohibited 
informational blackmail directly, functioned in fact as a rough outline of the 
law of criminal libel: 
 
1.  If the information published is false, then the publisher 
published libel and therefore is guilty of criminal libel. 
 
2.  If the information published is true but was made as a 
realization of a threat, the publisher is guilty under common 
law libel and does not deserve to enjoy the new statutory 
modification of the defense of truth because he did not act 
with good motives. 
 
3.  It is unlawful to threaten what a person does not have a 
legal right to do.
132
 
 
As evidenced above, the rationale underlying the criminalization of 
informational blackmail was simply the protection of the interest of 
reputation, and as such, was not regarded as a serious crime but only as a 
misdemeanor. 
As previously noted, there were two other sections in the Larceny Act of 
1916 that were later interpreted to join Section 31 in penalizing the behavior 
 
128. 69 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3rd ser.) (1843) 1232. 
129. Id. 
130. Libel Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 96, § 6 (Eng.). 
131. Id. 
132. See id. § 3. 
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of informational blackmail.  We will now proceed to examine the 
development of these provisions. 
Section 29(1)(i) reads as follows: 
 
Every person who— 
 
i.  utters, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or 
writing demanding of any person with menaces, and 
without any reasonable or probable cause, any property or 
valuable thing; 
 
. . . shall be guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof liable 
to penal servitude for life . . . .
133
 
 
The origins of this provision are in the Black Act of 1722.
134
  The Black 
Act was intended to deal with incidents of stealing and destroying deer, 
robbing warrens and other illegal practices carried out either by thieves with 
their faces blackened or by thieves sending anonymous demands.
135
  To 
combat these activities, the legislature included in the Black Act, inter alia, a 
provision that banned the sending of letters written under anonymous or 
fictitious names demanding money, venison, or other valuable things.
136
 
Both the background that led to the enactment of the statute and the 
preamble of the statute indicate that the intention of this provision was to 
prohibit demands coupled with threats of violence to a person or property.
137
  
 
133. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 29 (Eng.). 
134. Black Act, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, § 1 (Eng.).  In 1754, the same penalty as in the Black Act 
was provided for the sending of any letter threatening to kill or murder any other persons or to burn 
their houses.  1754, 27 Geo. 2, c.15 (Eng.).  In 1757 it was made a misdemeanor to send a letter 
threatening to accuse another of any crime punishable by death, transportation, or the pillory, with a 
view or intent to extort money or property from that person.  1757, 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, § 1 (Eng.).  It 
should be noted that at common law, threatening destruction to life and property for the purpose of 
extorting money was a high misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment.  See 2 WILLIAM 
OLDNALL RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1829 (1824).  Section 29(1)(i) in 
its current form was first introduced in the Consolidating and Amending Act of 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, 
c. 29, § 8 (Eng.).  This provision replaced a similar provision that prohibited demanding money or 
other valuable things, but did require the existence of menace.  Cf. 1823, 4 Geo. 4, c. 54, § 3 (Eng.). 
135. See 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 22 (Eng.), repealed by 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 27, § 1 (Eng.); see 
also R v. Robinson, (1796) 2 Leach 749, 765; Winder, supra note 109, at 34. 
136. Black Act, 1722, 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, § 1 (Eng.).  The offense reads: ―if any Person or Persons 
[whether armed, disguised, or neither] shall knowingly send any Letter without any Name subscribed 
thereto, or signed with a Fictitious Name, demanding Money, [ransom], or other valuable Thing[s], 
[they] shall be adjudged guilty of Felony, and shall suffer Death.‖  Id. 
137. The 1722 statute was amended in 1754 to include situations where no express demand for 
money, venison, or other valuable things has been made.  See 1754, 27 Geo. 2, c. 15.  In 1757, the 
prohibition was extended to include the use of anonymous letters threatening to accuse any person of 
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However, in R v. Robinson,
138
 the first case in which the courts used the Black 
Act to punish a defendant who sent a letter demanding property with a threat 
to accuse a person of murder, the court pointed out that a threat is not a 
necessary element of the offense, stating: ―The statute speaks of a demand 
generally, without requiring any particular circumstances, other than by a 
letter without any name subscribed thereto, or signed with a fictitious 
name . . . .‖139  As a result of this court‘s interpretation, any demand, even if 
not coupled with a threat, could have been viewed as criminal behavior.  The 
Consolidating and Amending Act of 1827 corrected this defect by adding two 
elements to the offense: the requirement of menace and the requirement that 
the demand was made without reasonable cause.
140
  The addition of the 
element of menace was to restrict the applicability of the offense only to 
threats of personal injury or damage to property.
141
  This offense was not 
intended to apply to threats to publish embarrassing information about a 
person, i.e., informational blackmail.
142
 
Until 1895, there were almost no cases that dealt with interpreting the 
element of menace.
143
  In 1895, R v. Tomlinson was brought before the 
court.
144
  In Tomlinson, the defendant had threatened to disclose his former 
employer‘s allegedly indecent behavior to the employer‘s wife.145  Although 
the facts of this case were most suitable to be subject to an action under 
Section 3 of the Libel Act of 1843, Tomlinson was indicted under Section 44 
of the Larceny Act 1861 (the predecessor to Section 29).
146
  The most 
significant impact of the section charged is that it determines the punishment 
attached to each offense.  Whereas Section 3 of the Libel Act of 1834 was a 
misdemeanor offense, Section 44 was a felonious one. 
The Tomlinson court, in trying to reach what seemed to it to be a just 
result, unnecessarily interpreted the element of menace in an expansive way.  
The court held that the menace element in Section 44 does not require a threat 
of injury to the person or property of the victim, or a threat to accuse him of a 
 
an infamous crime ―with a View or Intent to extort or gain Money.‖  See 1757, 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, § 1.  
Later, Parliament made it illegal for a person to maliciously threaten another with an accusation of an 
infamous crime, even if done without using a letter.  See 1823, 4 Geo. 4, c. 54, § 5 (Eng.). 
138. (1796) 2 Leach 749. 
139. Id. at 764. 
140. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, § 8. 
141. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM., EIGHTH REPORT, THEFT AND RELATED OFFENCES, 
1966, Cmnd. 2977, at 54; see also Winder, supra note 109, at 36–41. 
142. With the exception of threats to accuse a person of serious crimes.  See 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 
4, c. 29, § 8. 
143. Winder, supra note 109, at 37–38. 
144. R v. Tomlinson, (1895) 1 Q.B. 706 (Eng.). 
145. Id. 
146. Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, § 44 (Eng.). 
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crime: ―[I]t may well be held (though I am laying down no exhaustive 
definition of the word) to include menaces or threats of a danger by an 
accusation of misconduct, though of misconduct not amounting to a crime.‖147  
The offense may be committed if there be a threat to accuse him of 
misconduct not amounting to an offense against the criminal law. 
This case marked the emergence of blended rationale of the Libel Act 
with the statutory extortion rationales, and the beginning of the view that the 
extortion offenses criminalize all threats to do a non-criminal act as long as 
the threats have been made ―without any reasonable or probable cause.‖148 
Until the Tomlinson case, a criminal threat to inform a third party of the 
victim‘s non-criminal behavior, with intent to extort money from the victim, 
was only a misdemeanor.  The Tomlinson case made such a threat a felony for 
the first time.  Forty-two years later, in Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass‟n,149 Lord 
Atkins recognized the difficulties in the Tomlinson holding.  However, after 
the Larceny Act of 1916 was enacted, he felt that he must follow the old 
ruling. 
 
If the matter came to us for decision for the first time I think 
there would be something to be said for a construction of 
―menace‖ which connoted threats of violence and injury to 
person or property, and a contrast might be made between 
―menaces‖ and ―threats‖ as used in other sections of the 
various statutes.  But in several cases it has been decided that 
―menace‖ in this subsection and its predecessors is simply 
equivalent to threat: . . . .  The Larceny Act, 1916, was passed 
after these decisions and I think they must be accepted: 
though possibly some of the expressions in some of the 
judgments are open to criticism.
150
 
 
Section 29(1)(ii) and Section 29(1)(iii) read as follows: 
 
 
147. Tomlinson, (1895) 1 Q.B. at 708–09. 
148. Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, § 44.  In subsequent years, after the enactment of 
the Larceny Act of 1916, this broad interpretation brought confusion and incoherence in cases 
involving blackmail and extortion offenses.  See, e.g., Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass‘n, [1937] A.C. 
797, 797 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that under Section 29(1)(i) of the 1916 Larceny 
Act it is blackmail for one to threaten to do what normally he has a legal right to do, but not when 
―his cause is not reasonably capable of being associated with the promotion of lawful business 
interests.‖); Hardie & Lane, Ltd. v. Chilton, (1928) 2 K.B. 306, 308–09 (A.C.); R v. Denyer, (1926) 2 
K.B. 258, 260 (Ct. Crim. App.); Ware & De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass‘n, (1921) 3 K.B. 40, 
40 (A.C.). 
149. Thorne, [1937] A.C. at 797. 
150. Id. at 806. 
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1.  Every person who— 
 
ii.  utters, knowing the contents thereof, any letter or 
writing accusing or threatening to accuse any other person 
(whether living or dead) of any crime to which this section 
applies, with intent to extort or gain thereby any property 
or valuable thing from any person; 
 
iii.  with intent to extort or gain any property or valuable 
thing from any person accuses or threatens to accuse either 
that person or any other person (whether living or dead) of 
any such crime; 
 
. . . shall be guilty of felony, and on conviction thereof liable 
to penal servitude for life . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
3.  This section applies to any crime punishable with death, or 
penal servitude for not less than seven years, or any assault 
with intent to commit any rape, or any attempt to commit any 
rape, or any solicitation, persuasion, promise, or threat 
offered or made to any person, whereby to move or induce 
such person to commit or permit the abominable crime of 
buggery, either with mankind or with any animal.
151
 
 
These provisions embody, with modifications, the common law rules of 
robbery and extortion regarding a threat to accuse a person of a crime.
152
 
The development of this offense began within the law of robbery.  At 
common law, the classic definition of robbery was obtaining property from 
another by a present and immediate threat of personal violence.
153
  During 
these years, the courts interpreted this offense broadly, such that it included 
the threat of future violence and threats to accuse a person of an unnatural 
crime.
154
 
At the end of the eighteenth century, courts began to expand the definition 
of robbery to include present threats to accuse a person of an unnatural crime.  
The guilt or innocence of the party accused was regarded as immaterial.
155
  At 
 
151. Larceny Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 29 (Eng.). 
152. 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 149 (MacMillan 
1883). 
153. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 372 (2d ed. 1957). 
154. Id. 
155. See R v. Richards, (1868) 11 COX 43; R v. Cracknell, (1866) 10 COX 408. 
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that time, a sodomy conviction carried a death sentence.  ―[S]odomy was 
regarded as such an unspeakable crime that Blackstone literally refused to 
refer to it by name, speaking of it as ‗the infamous crime against 
nature . . . the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature . . . a 
crime not fit to be named.‘‖156  Consequently, accusing a person of 
committing an unnatural crime could have resulted in a danger to the 
accused‘s life and safety and therefore was viewed as ―a coercion which men 
cannot resist.‖157 
The early cases that dealt with a threat to accuse a person of sodomy as 
robbery all involved aggravating circumstances in which the victims had been 
in fear for their lives, and therefore, the facts could have supported a 
conviction for plain robbery.
158
  It was only in 1784, in R v. Hickman,
159
 that 
the court applied the offense of robbery to a case where the facts suggested no 
threat of personal violence and no aggravating circumstances.
160
  Hickman 
was a guard in the complex where the victim lived.
161
  The victim invited 
Hickman to his apartment.
162
  A few days after their meeting, Hickman 
threatened to accuse the victim of sodomy unless the victim paid him.
163
  The 
victim testified in court that when he parted with his money he did not fear 
any violence and was under no apprehension of personal danger, but rather, he 
feared for his character.
164
  Although the victim did not fear for his life, the 
court convicted Hickman of robbery, holding that ―‗to most men the idea of 
losing their fame and reputation was equally if not more terrific than the dread 
of personal injury.‘‖165  Twelve years later, in R v. Knewland,166 the court 
placed the fear of being accused of committing an unnatural offense on equal 
 
156. PERKINS, supra note 153, at 372. 
157. Long v. State, 12 Ga. 293, 319 (1852). 
158. See, e.g., R v. Donnally, (1779) 1 Leach 193; R v. Jones, (1776) 1 Leach 139.  In Jones, 
the defendant threatened to accuse the victim of sodomitical practices and applied actual force as 
well.  1 Leach at 140–41.  The defendant forcibly held the victim‘s arm in a way that prevented the 
victim from getting away.  Id. at 140.  At trial, the victim declared that he was in great fear for his 
personal safety.  Id.  In Donnally, the victim testified that he thought that not complying with the 
defendant‘s demands would cost him his life.  1 Leach at 194.  It should also be noted that in both 
cases the courts implied that the allegations were false.  Jones, 1 Leach at 141; Donnally, 1 Leach at 
196. 
159. (1784) 1 Leach 278. 
160. Id. at 279. 
161. Id. at 278. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 279. 
165. Perkins, supra note 153, at 372 (quoting Hickman, 1 Leach at 280). 
166. [1796] 2 Leach 721. 
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standing with the fear of losing life itself, ―a punishment more terrible, both in 
apprehension and reality, than even death itself.‖167 
Subsequent to Hickman, the courts, when referring to the law of robbery, 
declared that the force and terror required for the completion of the crime is of 
two kinds: a terror that leads the victim ―to apprehend an injury to his 
person,‖ and a terror that leads him ―to apprehend an injury to his character‖ 
or an injury to his property.
168
  Although the courts extensively used the 
terminology of ―injury to a character,‖ only one type of threat to cause such 
injury was recognized—a threat to accuse someone of sodomitical 
practices.
169
  A threat of injury to character other than the accusation of 
sodomitical practices has never been deemed sufficient for convictions of 
robbery.
170
  Therefore, threats to prosecute for any other offense, or 
accusations of other crimes, although they may have the effect of extorting 
money or property from a person, did not make the transaction a robbery.  For 
example, obtaining money by a threat to take the party before the magistrate 
and from there to prison did not qualify as a threat sufficient to constitute 
robbery.
171
 
There were two major constraints to the common law rule that viewed a 
threat to accuse a person of unnatural crimes as robbery.  One constraint was 
the requirement that the money must be taken immediately after the threat was 
made.
172
  Therefore, in cases where the blackmailer gave the victim time to 
respond to his demand, the demand was no longer viewed as robbery.  This 
constraint arose from the notion that in the time that elapsed between the 
demand and the tendering of the money, the victim could procure assistance 
and not surrender to the blackmailer‘s demands.173  The other constraint was 
that the common law rule applied only when the threat was uttered to the one 
who was about to be accused of committing an unnatural crime.  Therefore, in 
R v. Edwards,
174
 the court held that a threat uttered to a wife accusing her 
husband of committing an unnatural crime did not amount to robbery.
175
 
 
167. Id. at 731. 
168. See id. at 730.  Threats to property were confined to threats of burning houses.  Id. at 730 
n.1. 
169. Id. at 730; see also R v. Egerton, [1819] Russ & Ry. 375; R v. Cannon, [1809] Russ & Ry. 
146, 146–47. 
170. See generally Knewland, 2 Leach 721. 
171. Id. at 731. 
172. R v. Jackson, (1803) 1 East P.C. add. 21, 23–24; Winder, supra note 109, at 28. 
173. Jackson, 1 East P.C. add. at 21–24.  Furthermore, if at the time of the payment the victim 
parted with his money for the only purpose of bringing the offender to justice, even if at the 
beginning of the negotiations he apprehended injury to his person or character, it is not a robbery.  
See R v. Reane, (1794) 2 Leach 616; Winder, supra note 109, at 28. 
174. (1833) 1 M. & Rob. 257. 
175. Id.; Winder, supra note 109, at 28. 
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In 1827, this common law rule was granted a statutory recognition as a 
simple robbery, and in 1837, it became a separate felony.
176
  However, the 
statutory recognition was only temporary, because the statute of 1837 was 
abolished by the 1861 Larceny Act.
177
 
As for threatening to accuse a person of committing a serious crime, not 
only an unnatural one, a 1757 law made the sending of a letter threatening to 
accuse a person of certain crimes with a view or intent to extort or gain money 
a misdemeanor crime, punishable with seven years‘ transportation, a 
punishment significantly lighter than the death sentence attached to a threat to 
accuse a person of an unnatural crime.
178
 
These statutory provisions dealing with threats to accuse a person of a 
crime sought to abolish the common law constraints of the law of robbery.  
Therefore, unlike the common law rule, the provisions did not require the 
threat to be successful, nor did they require it to be made in the presence of 
the victim or for the immediate transfer of the property. 
After showing that Section 29 was never intended to deal with instances 
of informational blackmail (except for threats to accuse a person of a crime), 
this Part will now continue to examine the last provision in the Larceny Act of 
1916, which was applied to informational blackmail behaviors. 
Section 30 of the Larceny Act of 1916 reads as follows: ―Every person 
who with menaces or by force demands of any person anything capable of 
being stolen with intent to steal the same shall be guilty of felony and on 
conviction thereof liable to penal servitude for any term not exceeding five 
years.‖179 
The origins of this provision can be traced to the Act of 1734, which dealt 
with attempted robbery.
180
  In those days, an attempt to commit a crime was 
treated as a misdemeanor.  The 1734 Act was enacted in order to punish 
attempted robbery more severely.
181
  According to the 1734 Act, any person 
who assaulted another with any offensive weapon or who, by menace or in 
any forcible or violent manner, demanded money or chattels from another 
person with intent to rob that person was guilty of a felony.
182
  Therefore, the 
menace requirement in the Act was of such nature that its existence would 
 
176. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 87, § 4 (Eng.); 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, § 7 (Eng.). 
177. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96, § 47 (Eng.) 
178. 1757, 30 Geo. 2, c. 24, § 1 (Eng.); 1823, 4 Geo. 4, c. 54, § 3 (Eng.); 1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 
29, § 8 (Eng.); Larceny Act, 1861, § 46.  In R v. Robinson, (1796) Leach 749, 756, the court held that 
the 1757 statute did not repeal the Black Act of 1722 because the latter applies to cases that include 
sending letters with a view to extort money though no demand is made.  Id. at 483. 
179. 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50, § 30 (Eng.). 
180. 7 Geo. 2, c. 21 (Eng.). 
181. XI SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 532 (1938). 
182. Id. 
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amount to robbery, i.e., present a threat of immediate personal violence, an 
accusation of unnatural crime, or threats to burn houses.
183
  Section 5 of the 
criminal statute of 1823
184
 repealed the 1734 provision and changed its 
wording from prohibiting demands with ―intent to rob or commit robbery‖ to 
prohibiting demands by menace or by force with ―intent to steal.‖185 
R v. Walton
186
 was one of the first cases to interpret the requirement of 
―intent to steal‖ within the statute.  Walton and his co-defendant were indicted 
and convicted under Section 45 of the Larceny Act of 1861 (the predecessor 
of Section 30) for obtaining money from their victim by false presentation that 
they held a distress warrant authorizing them to seize the victim‘s goods for 
overdue rent.
187
  The trial court instructed the jury as a matter of law that 
Walton‘s conduct ―(if believed) constituted a menace within the statute.‖188  
The Court of Criminal Appeals overturned the conviction, holding that the 
threat was not inherently coercive, and therefore, there was a need to show 
circumstances of intimidation in order to claim the existence of a coercive 
effect. 
 
The question then arises what are the incidents attending the 
procurement of money or property by menace or threat 
necessary to constitute stealing . . . .  [I]f a man is induced to 
part with property through fear or alarm, he is no longer 
acting as a free agent, and is no longer capable of the consent 
above referred to.  And accordingly, in the cases cited in 
argument, the threatened violence, whether to persons or 
property, was of a character to produce in a reasonable man 
some degree of alarm or bodily fear . . . .  The essential matter 
is that it be of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of a 
person on whom it operates, and take away from his acts that 
element of free, voluntary action which alone constitutes 
consent . . . .  [A] threat or menace to execute a distress 
warrant is not necessarily of a character to excite fear or 
alarm.  On the other hand, the menace may be made with 
such gesture and demeanour, or with such unnecessarily 
 
183. Winder, supra note 109, at 42–43. 
184. 4 Geo. 4, c. 54 (Eng.). 
185. Winder, supra note 109, at 42–43. The section was reenacted in Section 6 of the 
Consolidating Act of 1827, which was later reenacted in the 1837 Act to Amend the Laws Relating 
to Robbery and Stealing from the Person.  See 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 87 (Eng.). 
186. [1863] Le. & Ca. 288.  
187. Id. at 289. 
188. Id. at 298. 
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violent acts, or under such circumstances of intimidation as 
to have that effect.
189
 
 
In its holding, the court ruled that to satisfy the ―intent to steal‖ element, a 
threat must negate the owner‘s consent, and for a consent to be negated, 
personal intimidation must exist.
190
 
This view was repealed in 1914 in R v. Boyle.
191
  Boyle threatened a 
company chairman with printed attacks that would reduce the market price of 
the company‘s shares.192  He demanded payment for refraining from such 
publication.
193
  Boyle was indicted under Section 45 of the Larceny Act of 
1861.
194
  In upholding Boyle‘s conviction, the appellate court rationalized its 
decision by referring to the holdings in Walton and Tomlinson.  The court 
inferred from these cases that the word ―menace‖ should be liberally 
construed to include not only threats of physical violence or intimidation but 
also threats of injury to property or character, asserting: 
 
We do not think that the meaning of the word ―menaces‖ in 
the section is so restricted. . . .  [A] wider meaning has been 
given to the word by later decisions, beginning with Reg. v. 
Walton . . . .  If the threat was of a character to produce in an 
ordinary man such a degree of fear or alarm as would 
―unsettle his mind and take away from his acts that element 
of free voluntary action which alone constitutes consent,‖ and 
was made with that intent, it would constitute the offence 
under the section now under consideration notwithstanding 
that the threat was not of physical violence or of injury to 
character.  A similar view was taken of the meaning of the 
word as used in the previous section (s. 44) of the Larceny 
Act, 1861, by the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in Reg. v. 
Tomlinson.  Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. delivered a 
judgment wherein he held that the word ―menaces‖ must be 
construed in a wide sense, and moreover that it was not 
confined to a threat of injury to the person or property of the 
person threatened.  Some of the expressions used by Wills J. 
in that case may have gone too far, but we agree with him that 
the doctrine that the threat must be of a nature to operate on a 
 
189. Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
190. Id.; see also R v. Robertson, [1864] Le. & Ca. 483, 487–89; WILLIAM OLDALL RUSSELL, 
RUSSELL ON CRIME 876 (J.W. Cecil Turner ed., 11th ed. 1958); Winder, supra note 109, at 44. 
191. [1914] 3 K.B. 339. 
192. Id. at 340. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
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man of reasonably sound or ordinarily firm mind should 
receive a liberal construction in practice.  We think it would 
be unwise to attempt to lay down any exhaustive definition of 
the words of the section.  The degree of fear or alarm which a 
threat may be calculated to produce upon the mind of the 
person on whom it is intended to operate may vary in 
different cases and in different circumstances.  A threat to 
injure a man‘s property may be more serious to him and have 
greater effect upon his mind than a threat of physical 
violence.
195
 
 
A close reading of Walton suggests that the court in Boyle misread the 
Walton holding in inferring that in order to satisfy the requirement of ―intent 
to steal,‖ no personal intimidation was required.196  As we have seen, the 
Walton court held that the requirement of lack of consent, which constitutes 
an essential element in theft offenses, must be accompanied, for purposes of 
extortion, by personal intimidation.
197
  It seems that the Boyle court ignored 
this additional element.  This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the 
court referred to the Tomlinson case to support its holding.  As mentioned 
above, the Tomlinson case interpreted Section 44 of the Larceny Act (the 
predecessor of Section 29(1)(i)), which had no requirement of ―intent to steal‖ 
and therefore could include wider varieties of threats. 
While the Boyle case dealt with a threat to injure property, its expansive 
interpretation of ―intent to steal‖ included informational blackmail as well by 
rejecting the requirement of personal intimidation.  During subsequent years, 
courts extended the interpretation of menace to include almost any threat and 
turned this offense from an attempted theft offense into an oral blackmail.
198
 
The requirement of negation of consent in Sections 29 and 30, as shown 
above, and the fact that the coercion element is almost immaterial for Section 
31 violations, support the assertion that Section 31 of the Larceny Act is not a 
property offense but rather a libel one in its essence.  The difference in the 
weight attached to the element of coercion in each of the offenses 
demonstrates the different purposes of these sections: the protection of one‘s 
character versus the protection of one‘s property.  Therefore, unlike the 
common view that informational blackmail is a theft offense, its origins 
stemmed from a different rationale, i.e., the protection of reputation.  
Furthermore, the menace requirement that appeared in Section 29(1)(i) and 
 
195. Id. at 343–44. 
196. Winder, supra note 109, at 46. 
197. R v. Walton, [1863] Le. & Ca. 288, 297. 
198. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM., supra note 141, at 55.  The court extended the 
interpretation of Section 30 as well because Section 29 does not cover oral threats.  Id. 
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Section 30, as compared to the requirement of ―intent to extort‖ that appeared 
in Section 31 and Sections 29(1)(ii) and (iii), supports the assertion that 
Section 29(1)(i) and Section 30 were not intended to deal with informational 
blackmail but rather with blackmail as extortion, i.e., a threat to use illegal 
force.  Any other interpretation would make Sections 29(1)(ii) and (iii) 
redundant.
199
 
The broad interpretation that the courts have given to Section 29, to 
include ―threats of any action detrimental to or unpleasant to the person 
addressed,‖200 made the threat of informational blackmail punishable with 
imprisonment for life, provided the threat was in writing.
201
  In cases where 
the threats were only oral, the automatic alternative was indictment under 
Section 30.  Section 31 was rarely used, although it was the only section that 
was originally designed to combat informational blackmail. 
In summary, the history of English law regarding informational blackmail 
reveals two important points: 
 
1.  Informational blackmail was intended to protect reputation, not 
property, and should be seen as part of the law of criminal libel. 
 
2.  Because information blackmail protects reputation, it should not have 
amounted to a felonious offense. 
 
With these points in mind, we will now proceed to examine the 
development of the law of informational blackmail and criminal libel in the 
United States. 
B. Defamation in the United States 
The crime of libel and the tort of defamation, as they evolved in English 
law, were adopted in America by the colonists.
202
  The common law rule 
regarding truth as a defense to criminal libel was adopted as well.
203
  
However, this rule gradually changed due to controversies regarding seditious 
libel.  In 1805, the New York Legislature passed a law providing that in 
prosecutions of libel it should be lawful for the defendant to give in evidence 
the truth of the publication if the matter was ―published with good motives 
 
199. Winder, supra note 109, at 22. 
200. Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass‘n, [1937] A.C. 797, 817 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
201. CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMM., supra note 141, at 55. 
202. Roy Robert Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43, 46 (1931). 
203. Commonwealth v. Snelling, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 321, 327 (1834); Commonwealth v. 
Morris, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 176, 179–80 (1811). 
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and for justifiable ends.‖204  In 1872, Massachusetts enacted a similar 
statute.
205
  By 1930, thirty-five American jurisdictions had express 
constitutional or statutory provisions allowing for truth as a defense in libel 
cases if the information was ―published with good motives and for justifiable 
ends.‖206  Therefore, in most U.S. states, in order to prevail in a criminal libel 
suit, the defendant had to show both that his utterance stated the facts and that 
the publication was made ―with good motives and for justifiable ends.‖ 
The adoption of the U.S. Constitution and the early interpretation by the 
courts of the First Amendment did not change the rules regarding criminal 
libel.
207
  The notion was that there were certain classes of speech whose 
prevention and punishment had never been thought to raise constitutional 
problems.
208
  The United States Supreme Court repeatedly upheld criminal 
libel statutes as constitutional.
209
  However, unlike English courts, the Court in 
its rhetoric did not abandon the old breach of the peace rationale. 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
210
 the Supreme Court sustained a 
conviction under a New Hampshire criminal libel statute.
211
  Chaplinsky 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute as violating his First 
Amendment right of expression.
212
  The Supreme Court rejected this claim, 
holding: 
 
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not 
absolute at all times and under all circumstances.  There are 
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include 
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ―fighting‖ words—those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach 
of the peace.
213
 
 
 
204. Law of April 6, 1805, ch. 90, 1805 N.Y. Laws, ch. 90. 
205. 1827 Mass. Acts ch. 107. 
206. Ray, supra note 202, at 47.  It should be noted that seven other jurisdictions made truth a 
complete defense.  Id. at 48; see, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 265 (1952). 
207. See Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a 
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 791 (1964). 
208. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
209. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 265; Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
210. 315 U.S. 568. 
211. Id. at 574. 
212. Id. at 570–71. 
213. Id. at 571–72. 
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In Beauharnais v. Illinois,
214
 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for 
violating Illinois‘s criminal group libel statute, which prohibited publishing or 
presenting any publication that ―portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or 
lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion‖ and 
that ―exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, 
derision, or obloquy.‖215  The Supreme Court, following the Chaplinsky 
holding, rejected Beauharnais‘s claim that the statute violated his First 
Amendment rights, noting that nowhere at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution ―was there any suggestion that the crime of libel be abolished.‖216 
As to the defense of truth, the court upheld the constitutionality of the 
restriction of good motives and justifiable ends as a condition for introducing 
such a defense in criminal cases, stating: 
 
Illinois in common with many States requires a showing not 
only that the utterance state the facts, but also that the 
publication be made ―with good motives and for justifiable 
ends.‖ Ill. Const. Art. II, s 4.  Both elements are necessary if 
the defense is to prevail.  What has been called ―the common 
sense of American criminal law,‖ as formulated, with regard 
to necessary safeguards in criminal libel prosecutions, in the 
New York Constitution of 1821, Art. VII, s 8, has been 
adopted in terms by Illinois.  The teaching of a century and a 
half of criminal libel prosecutions in this country would go by 
the board if we were to hold that Illinois was not within her 
rights in making this combined requirement.
217
 
 
Both the Chaplinsky and Beauharnais holdings referred to the historical 
criminal libel rationale of breach of the peace as the justification for denying 
constitutional protection.  Although at the time, it was acknowledged that 
while recognizing the common law breach of the peace theory, the Court had 
not required a factual showing of violence, either actual or potential. 
A new approach to criminal libel emerged in 1964 in Garrison v. 
Louisiana.
218
  Louisiana had a criminal libel statute that prohibited, inter alia, 
punishment for true statements made without actual malice.
219
  Garrison was 
convicted of criminal libel for his comments about a local judge.
220
  The 
 
214. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
215. Id. at 251. 
216. Id. at 254–55. 
217. Id. at 265–66. 
218. 379 U.S. 64 (1964). 
219. Id. at 66 n.1. 
220. Id. at 66–67. 
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Supreme Court accepted Garrison‘s claim that the statute unconstitutionally 
abridged his freedom of expression.
221
  The Court held that despite the 
different history and purposes of criminal libel and civil defamation statutes, 
the rule stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
222
 applying to civil 
defamation suits should apply to criminal libel indictments.
223
  Consequently, 
the Court extended the civil defamation standard of actual malice to criminal 
libel whenever criticism of public officials is concerned.
224
  The Court held 
that the First Amendment limits state power to impose criminal sanctions for 
criticism of the official conduct of public officials.
225
  According to the Court, 
―Louisiana‘s rejection of the clear-and-present-danger standard as irrelevant 
to the application of its [criminal defamation] statute,‖ and the lack of 
limitation in the statute itself to speech calculated to cause breaches of the 
peace, begged the conclusion that the statute was not narrowly drawn.
226
  In 
its reasoning, the Court acknowledged that the rationale for criminal libel as 
preventing breach of the peace had ceased to exist.
227
  The Court referred to 
Thomas Emerson‘s view of criminal libel and cited with concurrence the 
comments of the drafters of the Model Penal Code as to the suitability of libel 
law in the criminal system: 
 
―[U]nder modern conditions, when the rule of law is 
generally accepted as a substitute for private physical 
measures, it can hardly be urged that the maintenance of 
peace requires a criminal prosecution for private defamation.‖  
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 
72 Yale L.J. 877, 924 (1963).  The absence in the Proposed 
 
221. Id. at 77–78. 
222. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
223. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–76. 
224. Id.  The Supreme Court held that the Constitution limits state power, in a civil action 
brought by a public official for criticism of his official conduct, to an award of damages for a false 
statement made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.  Id. at 74, 78–79. 
225. Id. at 78. 
226. Id. at 70. 
227. Id. at 69; see also John H. Kelly, Criminal Libel and Free Speech, 6 U. KAN. L. REV. 295, 
320 (1958). 
 
As dueling yielded to the civil suit, libel ceased to result in breaches of the 
peace, and in an effort to preserve criminal prosecution, in an age without 
significant private violence, most states defined the crime according to the 
definitions accepted in the more common civil cases.  The emphasis was no 
longer on the effect of the public peace but on the tendency of the publication to 
damage the individual, and the case law following the statutes broadened the 
definition so that the crime became practically indistinguishable from the tort.  
Id. 
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Official Draft of the Model Penal Code of the American Law 
Institute of any criminal libel statute on the Louisiana pattern 
reflects this modern consensus.  The ALI Reporters, in 
explaining the omission, gave cogent evidence of the 
obsolescence of Livingston‘s justification: ―It goes without 
saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified merely by the 
fact that defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways 
that entitle him to maintain a civil suit.  Usually we reserve 
the criminal law for harmful behavior which exceptionally 
disturbs the community‘s sense of security.  It seems evident 
that personal calumny falls in neither of these classes in the 
U.S.A., that it is therefore inappropriate for penal control, and 
that this probably accounts for the paucity of prosecutions 
and the near desuetude of private criminal libel legislation in 
this country.‖228 
 
The Court in fact rejected the interest of having a good reputation as a valid 
justification for criminalizing libel, holding that only the historical rationale, 
i.e., breach of the peace, could justify such criminalization.
229
 
With respect to the defense of truth when public officials are involved, the 
Court departed from its previous recognition of the defense as a qualified one, 
holding that it would be unconstitutional to negate the defense of truth on a 
showing of malice in the sense of ill will.
230
  The Court held that when the 
criticism is of public officials and of public business, the public interest in the 
dissemination of truth triumphs over the interest in private reputation.
231
  
Therefore, as maintained by the Court, if there is a legal right to make a 
publication and the statement is true, the end is justifiable.
232
  For that reason, 
a finding of malice based on intent merely to inflict harm is not enough; intent 
to inflict harm through falsehood is required.
233
  Nevertheless, the Garrison 
Court expressly reserved its judgment on the question of whether the defense 
of truth could require good motives and justifiable ends in purely private 
 
228. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 69–70.  In most modern criminal libel statutes, the element of 
breach of the peace was omitted.  The trend shifted the focus from breach of the peace to the 
tendency of the publication to damage one‘s reputation regardless of its effect upon the public.  See 
State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591, 595 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965); 2 RONALD A. ANDERSON,  
WHARTON‘S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 748–50 (1957); W. BLAKE ODGERS & ROBERT 
RITSON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 131 (6th ed. 1929); H.C. UNDERHILL, 3 
UNDERHILL‘S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 1637–38 (5th ed. 1956); Annotation, Character of Libel or 
Slander for Which Prosecution Will Lie, 19 A.L.R. 1470, 1470–71 (1922). 
229. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 69–70. 
230. Id. at 72–73. 
231. Id. 
232. See id. 
233. See id. at 73. 
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libels, while recognizing that different interests may be involved when purely 
private libels totally unrelated to public affairs are concerned.
234
 
The Garrison case represents the beginning of a merger between the 
standards required in civil defamation cases and the standards required in 
criminal libel cases.  Although the Court in Garrison limited its holding to 
libel of public officials and reserved its holding regarding private persons, the 
merger between the standards required in civil suits and criminal cases 
derived, in later cases, the element of falsity to be an essential requirement in 
―private persons‖ criminal libel cases.235  Furthermore after the Garrison 
decision, most criminal libel statutes were held unconstitutional, even in 
matters that concerned purely private libel, due to lack of distinction in the 
statutes between the law as applied to public officials and the law as applied 
to private persons.
236
 
C. Blackmail in the United States 
In 1796, New Jersey enacted the first state statute prohibiting sending 
letters containing threats to accuse a person of a crime with intent to extort 
money, goods, and chattel.
237
  In 1816, Georgia enacted a similar provision.
238
  
By the mid-twentieth century, almost all states had such provisions in their 
criminal codes.
239
 
 
234. Id. at 72. 
235. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974).  This conclusion is implicit 
in the Court‘s articulation of a standard of recovery that prohibits states from imposing strict liability 
for publication of allegedly false statements that are claimed to defame private individuals.  Cf. Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495–96 (1975) (holding that the First and Fourth 
Amendments bar states from sanctioning the ―publication of truthful information contained in official 
court records open to public inspection‖); Illinois v. Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966, 972 (Ill. 1984) 
(holding that the ―guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments have never required that truth 
be an absolute defense in a prosecution for criminal [libel] of a private person‖).  
236. See Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1096 (8th Cir. 1973); Gottschalk v. State, 575 
P.2d 289, 290 (Alaska 1978); Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Ark. 1975); Eberle v. Mun. Ct., 
127 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Helfrich, 922 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Mont. 1996); 
State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139, 143 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992);  State v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. 
1972). 
237. 1796 N.J. Laws ch. 108, § 57. 
238. 1816 Ga. Laws ch. 178, § 27. 
239. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 242, § 110 (1872); FLA. REV. STAT. § 2420 (1892); ILL. REV. 
STAT. ch. 30, § 111 (1845); 1873 Ind. Acts 139, ch. 49; 1873 Iowa Laws § 3871; 1802 Ky. Acts 115, 
§ 14; 1884 La. Acts. 63; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 26 (1841); 1835 Mass. Acts 718, § 17; 1816 Mich. 
Pub. Acts 128, § 48; 1839 Miss. Laws 138, § 58; 1825 Mo. Laws 308, § 82; MO. REV. STAT. § 1526. 
(1879); N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. 3, § 58 (1828); 1831 Ohio Laws 430, § 23; S.D. PENAL CODE § 613 
(1877); TENN. CODE § 4633 (1858); TEX. PENAL CODE art. 727 (1895); VT. REV. STAT. ch. 103, 
§ 23 (1851); VA. CODE tit. 54, § 14 (1873); WIS. STAT. § 38 (1849).  The only state that did not have 
such provision is New Mexico.  See Alice Kramer Griep, Comment, Criminal Law—A Study of 
Statutory Blackmail and Extortion in the Several States, 44 MICH. L. REV. 461, 464–65 (1945). 
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As demonstrated earlier, although the prohibition of a threat to accuse a 
person of a crime is a type of informational blackmail, it was penalized long 
before the classic informational blackmail was introduced into the criminal 
law.
240
  The rationale for prohibiting threats to accuse a person of a crime was 
not the protection of reputation.
241
  Originally, in cases where the allegations 
of criminal activity were true, the blackmailer had a duty to disclose the 
information under the rule of misprision of felony.
242
  Therefore, a transaction 
to conceal knowledge of a crime was illegal.  Furthermore, even in the 
absence of such a law, the criminalization of threats to accuse a person of a 
crime was (and still is) essential for the protection of the integrity of the legal 
system.  Allowing private justice in these cases might have distorted the 
criminal system by impairing its ability to shape social norms by means of 
publicly condemning those who deviate from them: 
 
The moral turpitude of threatening, for the purpose of 
obtaining money, to accuse a guilty person of the crime 
which he has committed, is as great as it is to threaten, for a 
like purpose, an innocent person of having committed a 
crime.  The intent is the same in both cases,—to acquire 
money without legal right, by threatening a criminal 
prosecution.  But threatening a guilty person for such a 
purpose is a greater injury to the public than to threaten an 
innocent one, for the reason that the object is likely to be 
attained, and the result is the concealment and compounding 
of felonies, to the injury of the state.
243
 
 
Moreover, allowing private justice would have denied the offender‘s 
rights to due process and to procedural protection.  It also ran the risk of 
leading to a state of affairs where only indigents were subject to public justice, 
because resource disparities would result in monetary penalties (i.e., 
blackmail money) for the rich and imprisonment for the poor, who could not 
afford to pay hush money.
244
  The reliability of the legal system required that 
such threats be made only within the system itself. 
Expanding the law to include informational blackmail other than threats to 
accuse a person of a crime was first introduced in the United States in 1827 in 
 
240. See supra Part III.A. 
241. See supra Part III.A. 
242. See supra Part III.A. 
243. People v. Eichler, 26 N.Y.S. 998, 999 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1894) (footnotes omitted). 
244. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Blackmail as Private Justice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1970 
(1993). 
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Illinois‘s penal code.245  Illinois‘s blackmail provision can be divided into two 
parts: The first part prohibited sending or delivering any letter threatening to 
accuse another of a crime or misdemeanor, or of exposing and publishing any 
of his or her infirmities or failings, with intent to extort; the second part 
prohibited, inter alia, threatening to accuse another of a crime or 
misdemeanor, or of exposing and publishing any of his or her infirmities or 
failings, though no money or valuable things were demanded.
246
  This two-
part reading begs the conclusion that the main focus of this law was neither on 
the coercion element nor on the property that was demanded, but rather the 
statute‘s main focus was on reputation, i.e., on the threats to expose 
information regardless of the threat maker‘s intentions. 
It was only after England‘s Libel Act of 1843 was enacted that other states 
followed Illinois and criminalized informational blackmail.  By the midpoint 
of the twentieth century, about thirty states had criminalized informational 
blackmail.
247
 
IV. REPUTATION AS AN INTEREST PROTECTED BY THE CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Three Concepts of Reputation 
There have been no attempts to define reputation in common law.  In fact, 
such an attempt would be futile, because reputation is a concept that keeps 
evolving and hence evades a single, static definition.  In protecting the interest 
of reputation, we protect ―an image of how people are tied together, or should 
be tied together, in a social setting.‖248  This image varies over time.249  As we 
examine the history of defamation law, we can identify the three concepts of 
reputation it was designed to uphold: ―reputation as property, as honor, and as 
dignity.‖250 
Reputation as property focuses on reputation in the marketplace and ―can 
be understood as a form of intangible property akin to goodwill.‖251  This 
 
245. 1827 Ill. Laws ch. 145, § 108. 
246. Id. 
247. Griep, supra note 239, at 465; see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, 
Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1111–12 (2002).  It 
should be noted that in some states like California and New York, informational blackmail appeared 
twice in the penal code: under the extortion and oppression chapter and under the libel section.  CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 518–24 (1872); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 552–561 (1880); see also ARIZ. PENAL CODE 
§§ 808–815, § 413 (1887); GA. CODE §§ 116–117 (1895); 1884 La. Laws 63–64. 
248. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the 
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 692–93 (1986). 
249. Id. at 693. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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concept of reputation ―presupposes that individuals are connected to each 
other through the institution of the market,‖ where no person has the right to a 
reputation other than that created by the evaluative processes of the market.
252
  
An individual can acquire such a reputation through efforts and labor, and the 
reputation‘s value is determined by the same marketplace mechanism that 
determines the value of any other property.
253
  Therefore, an injury to such a 
reputation without justification merits pecuniary compensation for the 
destruction of the results of an individual‘s labor and efforts.254  However, 
compensation will be given only to loss that the market can measure, i.e., 
pecuniary loss, and not to mere hurt feelings.
255
 
Reputation as honor considers an individual‘s reputation to be a ―personal 
reflection of the status which society ascribes to his social position.‖256  In this 
form of reputation, individuals are unequal, because they occupy different 
social roles, which are hierarchically arranged.
257
  Because honor is attached 
to one‘s social role, it is fixed and cannot be earned, bought, or exchanged.  
Unlike reputation as property, in which a man can always create a new 
reputation for himself, in reputation as honor one‘s identity is 
indistinguishable from his reputation.  Because honor is a shared social 
perception that goes beyond the behavior of particular individuals, it is viewed 
as a public good and thus requires more than the protection of merely 
individual interests.
258
 
Injury to one‘s reputation is in fact injury to the societal status structure, 
and hence to the social system.
259
  Therefore, an assault on a person‘s 
reputation is considered an assault on the entire community, and as a 
consequence, the society‘s interest in protecting such reputation is viewed as 
equally important to the interest of the individual.
260
  Moreover, because an 
injury to one‘s reputation is an injury to one‘s status and personal identity, the 
remedy of compensation does not suffice, and restoration of identity is 
required.
261
  For that reason, reputation as honor is linked most closely to 
criminal libel, where the truth of the statement is immaterial and the plaintiff‘s 
redress is vindication.  Criminal libel statutes help the victim, through the 
 
252. Id. at 695. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 700. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 702. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. at 703–04. 
261. Id. at 703–05. 
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state, to achieve vindication by focusing on the punishment of the libeler 
rather than on refuting the libel. 
Reputation as dignity refers to the ―relationship between the private and 
public aspects of the self.‖262  The concept of reputation as dignity assumes 
that the identity of an individual is the product of the social connections by 
which he is embedded in and attached to a community.
263
  Dignity is therefore 
the respect of others and of self that arises from full membership in society.  
In reputation as dignity, individuals have dual interests: maintaining social 
respect and ―defining and maintaining the contours of [their own] social 
constitution.‖264  In reputation as dignity, a reputation is not the result of 
individual achievement and cannot be valued in the marketplace; rather, it is 
simply essential and intrinsic in every human being.
265
  It is not a result of 
social roles and status: ―[H]onor is concerned with attributes of personal 
identity that stem from the characteristics of particular social roles, whereas 
dignity is concerned with the aspects of personal identity that stem from 
membership in the general community.‖266  As a result, the remedy for 
injuring reputation as dignity is rehabilitation, i.e., confirming the 
membership of the individual in the community through a declaratory 
judgment.
267
 
Each of the three concepts of reputation discussed above presupposes a 
different image of social order.  In the last fifty years, our social world has 
been dominated by images of both market and communitarian societies, 
reinforcing a view of reputation as a concept of property and dignity.  The 
value of egalitarianism caused our view of society as hierarchical to gradually 
decline and all but disappear, and in turn, our concept of reputation as honor 
declined as well.  As previously noted, the criminalization of the law of 
defamation functioned as a means to vindicate honor.  Under this system, a 
defamation victim ―achieved vindication not by disproving the libel, but 
rather by punishing the libeller.‖268  Once reputation was no longer viewed as 
an interest in protecting one‘s honor, the law of criminal libel had to change. 
 
262. Id. at 708. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 711. 
265. Id. at 715. 
266. Id. 
267. See id. 
268. Id. at 704.  According to Post, 
 
There is a clear analogy between the traditional common law of criminal libel 
and the ―Code of Honor‖ under which gentlemen duelists sought to ―avenge 
insults‖ and thereby achieve ―the restoration of wounded honor.‖  As the old 
saw would have it, ―The laundry of honor is only bleached with blood.‖ 
Id. at 704–05 (footnotes omitted).  A study conducted by Professor Leflar on criminal libel cases 
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The changes in the jurisprudence of the law of defamation indeed 
represented this shift in views of our social order, i.e., the movement from 
reputation as honor to reputation as property and reputation as dignity.  The 
acknowledgement that reputation does not protect social hierarchy 
transformed defamation into a purely private matter where the public has no 
interest of its own that requires protection by the criminal law. 
In addition, under both theories of reputation as property and reputation as 
dignity, falsity is an essential element in defamation law.  Under the first 
theory, if the publication is correct, there is no injury to one‘s reputation, 
because the market reflects value based on truthful information.
269
  Under the 
latter theory, one has a right to reputation only to the extent that it accurately 
reflects the self. 
B. Case Law and Reputation 
Although the developments in defamation law jurisprudence were made 
on behalf of constitutional protections that are external to the criminal law, 
they actually reflect the change in the images of social life described above.  
Therefore, they apply to pure criminal law considerations as well, i.e., to the 
validity of reputation as an interest worth protecting by the criminal law, First 
Amendment considerations aside.  The view that the criminal law has no 
 
supports the function of criminal libel as a means to protect reputation as honor.  Robert A. Leflar, 
The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REV. 984, 985–86 (1956).  Leflar 
concluded that 
 
Modern criminal defamation prosecutions appear on analysis to serve 
pretty much the same function as the early prosecutions for libel of ―great men.‖ 
The usual pattern in the political cases, which are more numerous than any other 
type of case from 1920 on, is one of the ―ins‖ prosecuting the ―outs,‖ of the 
winner prosecuting the loser.  Even the nonpolitical cases have overtones of the 
same character.  The successful prosecutions were, for the most part, for 
statements of a sort likely to have been unpopular at the time and place they 
were made. 
Since jury sympathy with the position of complaining witnesses was 
almost a prerequisite to conviction, the appellate cases give little or no evidence 
that the criminal rule was used as a means of protecting politically powerless 
persons from defamations that might have appealed to mass prejudice.  It was 
not much used as a sanction against irresponsible newspaper reports or 
editorials, though these have often been extremely damaging to libeled persons.  
In general it was not used against persons or groups in positions of influence or 
power, and practically could not have been; rather, it was used on behalf of such 
persons and groups against their detractors who were less fortunately situated. 
Id. at 1032 (footnotes omitted). 
269. See Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 406 (1981); 
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 30–35 (1979); Richard A. 
Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 397–401 (1978). 
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interest in protecting the harm caused to individuals‘ reputations was 
expressed in the Model Penal Code by the absence of a criminal libel 
provision in the proposed code and was later embraced by the Supreme Court 
in Garrison.
270
  In explaining the omission of such provision, the drafters of 
the Model Penal Code stated: 
 
One of the hardest questions we confront in drafting a 
Model Penal Code is whether to penalize anything like libel.  
It goes without saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified 
merely by the fact that defamation is evil or damaging to a 
person in ways that entitle him to maintain a civil suit.  
Usually we reserve the criminal law for harmful behavior 
which exceptionally disturbs the community‘s sense of 
security.  This may be because the harm done is very grave, 
as in rape or murder, so that even the remote possibility of 
being similarly victimized terrifies us.  Or our alarm may, as 
in the case of petty theft or malicious mischief, derive from 
the higher likelihood that such lesser harm will be inflicted 
upon us by those who manifest disregard of other people‘s 
ownership.  It seems evident that personal calumny falls in 
neither of these classes in the U.S.A., that it is therefore 
inappropriate for penal control, and that this probably 
accounts for the paucity of prosecutions and the near 
desuetude of private criminal libel legislation in this 
country.
271
 
 
To sum up thus far: Since the second half of the twentieth century, the 
common view has been that reputation is not an interest worthy of protection 
by the criminal law.  Furthermore, reputation as an interest justifies protection 
only from false statements.  Truthful statements will not be sanctioned.  The 
law will not protect one‘s reputation from truthful statements, not only 
because of First Amendment considerations but also because the very concept 
of reputation cannot allow it. 
V. THE UNAVOIDABLE CONNECTION BETWEEN BLACKMAIL AND THE LAW 
OF DEFAMATION 
This Article has shown that blackmail was an offense defined in the 
nineteenth century.  At that time the criminal codes reflected the norms of the 
 
270. See supra notes 218–29 and accompanying text. 
271. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt., at 44 (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961).  A question that 
will not be dealt with in this Article is if we view reputation as property, why shouldn‘t we view 
defamation like petty theft, i.e., taking another property without a claim of right? 
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moral code.  The criminal justice system had dual functions: protecting and 
maintaining the traditional code by punishing those who violated it and 
protecting the very people who violated the code in a particular way. 
 
The law, in other words, did two things at once.  First of all, it 
defined what a good reputation consisted of, what 
respectability and virtue meant; and what sorts of behaviors 
would forfeit that reputation (and, perhaps, forfeit one‘s 
freedom as well).  Yet at the same time, the law contained 
doctrines and institutions whose purpose was to preserve and 
protect the reputation of at least some of the people who 
belonged to respectable society—even when that person (man 
or woman) slipped and deviated, in certain common ways. 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . The system protected bourgeois respectability, and 
reinforced it, both by punishing (gross) deviations; but also 
by shielding some of those who lapsed, from the worst 
consequences of their misbehavior.
 272
 
 
Lawrence Friedman described this period as the ―Victorian compromise,‖ 
when the criminal law and its enforcement were tools used for monitoring and 
limiting behavior, as well as for protecting the reputations of reputable men 
who deviated quietly from the straight and narrow path of law and morality.
273
  
Rooted in the Victorian compromise was a system of class preference and 
hierarchy, ―the more high-class the gentleman, the more immunity.‖274 
This function of the criminal law reflected the concept of reputation as 
honor and the normative order of a status system.  Although in England this 
status hierarchy was more explicit than in the United States, it dominated both 
countries.
275
  It was important to protect the reputation of those who deviated 
from their proper social roles to preserve both these roles and the system as a 
whole.
276
  Exposing the faults of the upper statuses would have weakened the 
faith of the people in the honesty and decency of those who possessed such 
status.
277
  Furthermore, those who made the laws belonged to the class of 
 
272. Friedman, supra note 247, at 1098–99. 
273. Id. at 1102; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 127 (1993). 
274. Friedman, supra note 247, at 1102. 
275. See id. at 1096. 
276. Id. at 1106. 
277. Id. 
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people who were more vulnerable to attacks on their reputation, as they had 
more to lose if their infirmities and failings were made public.  Therefore, in 
enacting laws that protected reputation, the lawmakers were first and foremost 
protecting themselves.
278
 
Blackmail threatened the immunity of those individuals in the upper class; 
it threatened their ability to deviate from the straight and narrow path without 
losing their reputation and their standing in society.  ―[T]he more respectable 
and virtuous the Individual, the more [blackmailers] would . . . drag him 
before the Public, for the sake of extorting from the timid the Price of 
Silence.‖279  Thus, the law against informational blackmail was essential in 
order to protect reputation effectively.  Making the publication of information 
unlawful was insufficient to achieve the goal sought by the criminal libel 
prohibitions.  Threats to publish such information had to be banned as well.  
Threats were particularly disliked because they involved a shift of control and 
power, empowering the powerless and turning the hierarchy on its head.  This 
concern also explains the reason behind not criminalizing private bribery, 
which is the blackmail mirror image transaction.  When the victim approaches 
the information holder and offers to pay him for his silence, there is no shift of 
power, as the victim is still in control of the situation, and therefore, no crime 
has taken place. 
The question then, assuming this argument is correct, centers on why we 
need the construction of blackmail to protect reputation.  Why not just ban 
any threat to publish libel?  That is to say, why do we require the showing of 
―intent to extort‖?  The answer to this question becomes clearer once we 
examine the Libel Act of 1843.  As mentioned above, the Act recognized, for 
the first time, truth as a defense upon showing both good motives and public 
interest.  Penalizing the mere threat to publish libel does not take into account 
the development in libel law regarding truth as a qualified defense; the 
requirement of intent to extort does.  The requirement of intent to extort casts 
away any doubts as to the motives of the threat maker in publishing the 
information.  In fact, all it does is penalize a threat to do an unlawful act, i.e., 
publishing information without satisfying the requirements of the defense of 
truth.  In the words of Lord Campbell: 
 
The committee proposed to divide [libels] into three classes.  
The first and most aggravated was a class of offences so 
heinous and atrocious that, morally speaking transportation 
itself would be no inadequate punishment for them: he meant 
 
278. See generally MIKE HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL: PUBLICITY AND SECRECY IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE (1975). 
279. SELECT COMM., supra note 126, at 168. 
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where an attempt was made to extort money by the threat of 
libelling an individual or a member of his family, and the 
libel was published because the money was not paid.
280
 
 
Therefore, as long as criminal libel existed and as long as the defense of truth 
was not absolute, there was no paradox in the law of informational blackmail. 
In the last half of the twentieth century, the rationales underlying the 
protection of reputation changed and the notion became that the public has a 
right to know about certain behaviors.  The shift in the concept of reputation, 
along with constitutional jurisprudence, changed the perception of the amount 
of protection that the law ought to grant to the interest of reputation.  Whereas 
in the past, the concept of reputation as honor sought to protect the upper 
class, today the higher one‘s status, the less protected he is.  As noted earlier 
in this Article, New York Times v. Sullivan was the first case to begin this 
transformation by setting more rigid standards for public official plaintiffs in 
civil defamation suits.
281
  Garrison v. Louisiana
282
 applied these standards to 
criminal libel cases, and Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps
283
 completed 
the process by applying these rules to all matters of public concern, even if the 
plaintiff is a private figure.
284
  Today, not only does the First Amendment 
require that truth be an absolute defense regardless of the motive of the 
publisher, but also false defamations are protected, with the exception of those 
that are knowingly false or made with reckless disregard as to if they are true 
or false.
285
 
This change of concept should have affected all laws regarding the 
protection of reputation, but in fact it did not.  The law of informational 
blackmail was left behind.  From that point on, the ―paradox of blackmail‖ 
began to appear.  Although informational blackmail penalizes threats to 
expose truthful information, it has remained untouched both from a First 
Amendment perspective and from a criminal law perspective. 
Because blackmail protects views of reputation that are no longer valid in 
our society, the above account of blackmail law‘s development should have 
prompted reexamination of the possibility of legalizing informational 
blackmail. 
 
280. 69 PARL. DEB., H.L. (3rd ser.) (1843) 1232. 
281. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra notes 218–34 and accompanying text. 
283. 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986). 
284. It should be noted that a similar transformation occurred in the law of privacy.  See 
Friedman, supra note 247, at 1114–16. 
285. See Franklin, supra note 207. 
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As for how informational blackmail escaped reexamination, my opinion is 
that the offense got away on a technicality by being historically classified as a 
property offense instead of a reputation-protecting offense.  This explanation 
is supported by the above exploration of English law regarding blackmail and 
by taking into consideration that the major First Amendment jurisprudential 
developments of criminal libel law occurred after the publication of the Model 
Penal Code, which classified the blackmail provision as a theft offense.
286
 
As mentioned above, informational blackmail was first penalized in 
England under Section 3 of the Libel Act of 1843.
287
  Only in 1916 under the 
Larceny Act was the offense consolidated with other forms of blackmail and 
extortion.
288
  This consolidation, which appeared in U.S. state penal codes as 
well,
289
 was intended to bring together all the provisions that prohibited the 
obtaining of property using a threat to perform an unlawful act.  Because libel 
was then penalized, informational blackmail fell within this category.  The 
consolidation of the different provisions shifted the focus from their original 
rationales and the different interests they sought to protect to one common 
denominator—obtaining property.  As long as the offense of blackmail 
completed the offense of libel, the classification of blackmail as a property 
offense was consistent. 
In the United States this tendency was prominent in 1954 when the 
American Law Institute published a tentative draft of the Model Penal Code 
containing a proposed blackmail/extortion provision titled ―Theft by 
Intimidation.‖290  Informational blackmail was not regarded as unique or 
distinct from other types of threats but was viewed as one threat in a ―list of 
particular harms which must be threatened in order to come within the offense 
of extortion.‖291  Therefore eight years later, when criminal reputation-
protecting laws were reexamined, informational blackmail was classified as a 
property offense under the law of theft and thus was overlooked.
292
 
We can therefore conclude that the classification of informational 
blackmail as a property offense instead of a reputation-protecting offense 
saved this criminal prohibition from abolishment and resulted in what we now 
call the ―blackmail paradox.‖ 
 
286. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954). 
287. See supra Part III.A. 
288. See supra Part III.A. 
289. It should be noted that generally in the United States there was no process of consolidating 
different provisions because in most states the different threats appeared in one provision from the 
beginning. 
290. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954); see also MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 223.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
291. MODEL PENAL CODE § 206.3 cmt. 
292. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Delving into the history of criminal libel sheds light on the paradox of 
blackmail.  When first introduced, informational blackmail was intended to 
protect the interest of reputation and to serve as a supplement to the law of 
criminal libel.  At that time, reputation was regarded as an interest worth 
protecting by the criminal law because it protected a wider interest—the 
preservation of social roles and social hierarchy.  Informational blackmail was 
just a type of threat to perform unlawful acts. 
During the years, most state statutes consolidated the different threats to 
perform unlawful acts into one provision.  Informational blackmail appeared 
as one item in the list of forbidden behaviors and therefore was viewed as 
extortion.  This consolidation shifted the focus from the original rationale and 
the different interests each prohibition sought to protect to one common 
denominator—obtaining property.  Therefore when reputation was 
reexamined as an interest worth protection by the criminal law, informational 
blackmail was left behind because it was classified as a theft offense and its 
reputation origins were overlooked. 
It is my conclusion that in light of the above, the considerations that led to 
the criminalization of informational blackmail are no longer compelling, and 
therefore, as long as there is no change in the perception of defamation law, 
blackmail should be decriminalized. 
Decriminalizing informational blackmail should not be confused with 
morally embracing this kind of behavior.  The publication of private 
information to hurt a person, where there are no other benefits (except for the 
publisher‘s pleasure in seeing the other person hurt), is immoral but should 
still be legal, as are many other immoral behaviors.  Demanding money for 
silence will still be immoral; however, immorality alone is not sufficient to 
justify penalizing such behavior. 
